Précis of Consciousness
Consciousness begins by distinguishing seven forms of consciousness, by enumerating their differences, and by urging that theories of consciousness are under an obligation to treat them separately. Many philosophers and scientists have attempted to discuss consciousness in fully general terms, without first drawing distinctions or imposing restrictions. My view is that nothing good can come of efforts of this sort. When someone tells us that he or she has just written a book about consciousness, our first question should always be, “What forms of consciousness do you discuss in the book?” Unless there is a clear answer, we should consign the book to the flames, though of course, since it is important to be polite, we should do this only in the privacy of our imaginations.
The best way to describe Consciousness is to say that it offers characterizations of all of the seven forms of consciousness that it distinguishes, and fairly elaborate accounts of four of them.
To illustrate, one of...
KeywordsProperty Dualism Folk Psychology Phenomenal Consciousness Perceptual Consciousness Counterpart Relation
I have received valuable help from David Bennett in preparing this Précis.
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