Philosophical Studies

, Volume 160, Issue 3, pp 477–495 | Cite as

Reply to MacFarlane, Scharp, Shapiro, and Wright



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  5. Richard, M. (Manuscript A). What would an expressivist semantics be? Available online at
  6. Richard, M. (Manuscript B). Classical logic with truth value gaps and without supervaluations. Available online at
  7. Richard, M. (Manuscript C). What is disagreement? Available online at

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophy DepartmentHarvard UniversityCambridgeUSA

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