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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 162, Issue 2, pp 359–378 | Cite as

Intuitive knowledge

  • Elijah Chudnoff
Article

Abstract

In this paper I assume that we have some intuitive knowledge—i.e. beliefs that amount to knowledge because they are based on intuitions. The question I take up is this: given that some intuition makes a belief based on it amount to knowledge, in virtue of what does it do so? We can ask a similar question about perception. That is: given that some perception makes a belief based on it amount to knowledge, in virtue of what does it do so? A natural idea about perception is that a perception makes a belief amount to knowledge in part by making you sensorily aware of the concrete objects it is about. The analogous idea about intuition is that an intuition makes a belief amount to knowledge in part by making you intellectually aware of the abstract objects it is about. I expand both ideas into fuller accounts of perceptual and intuitive knowledge, explain the main challenge to this sort of account of intuitive knowledge (i.e. the challenge of making sense of intellectual awareness), and develop a response to it.

Keywords

Perception Intuition Knowledge Epistemology 

Notes

Acknowledgments

I presented earlier versions of this paper at a meeting of the Arché Methodology Workshop at St. Andrews, and a conference associated with the Descartes Lectures at the Tilburg Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science. The Q&A sessions on both occasions were instructive, and I thank those in attendance for their participation. I thank John Bengson, Ed Erwin, Uriah Kriegel, Kirk Ludwig, Susanna Siegel, Ernie Sosa, and Anand Vaidya for additional helpful comments and discussion.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of MiamiCoral GablesUSA

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