Moral responsibility and the continuation problem
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Typical incompatibilists about moral responsibility and determinism contend that being basically morally responsible for a decision one makes requires that, if that decision has proximal causes, it is not deterministically caused by them. This article develops a problem for this contention that resembles what is sometimes called the problem of present (or cross-world) luck. However, the problem makes no reference to luck nor to contrastive explanation. This article also develops a solution.
KeywordsIncompatibilism Indeterminism Free will Luck Moral responsibility
This paper was made possible through the support of a grant from the John Templeton Foundation. The opinions expressed in this publication are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the John Templeton Foundation. I am grateful to Randy Clarke and Stephen Kearns for comments on a draft.
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