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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 162, Issue 2, pp 237–255 | Cite as

Moral responsibility and the continuation problem

  • Alfred R. Mele
Article

Abstract

Typical incompatibilists about moral responsibility and determinism contend that being basically morally responsible for a decision one makes requires that, if that decision has proximal causes, it is not deterministically caused by them. This article develops a problem for this contention that resembles what is sometimes called the problem of present (or cross-world) luck. However, the problem makes no reference to luck nor to contrastive explanation. This article also develops a solution.

Keywords

Incompatibilism Indeterminism Free will Luck Moral responsibility 

Notes

Acknowledgments

This paper was made possible through the support of a grant from the John Templeton Foundation. The opinions expressed in this publication are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the John Templeton Foundation. I am grateful to Randy Clarke and Stephen Kearns for comments on a draft.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Florida State UniversityTallahasseeUSA

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