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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 161, Issue 3, pp 391–401 | Cite as

Straightening priority out

  • Tatjana von Solodkoff
Article

Abstract

In recent work, Louis deRosset (Philosophical Studies 149:73–97, 2010) has argued that priority theorists, who hold that truths about macroscopic objects can be metaphysically explained without reference to such things, cannot meet an independently motivated constraint upon good explanation. By clarifying the nature of the priority theorist’s project, I argue that deRosset’s argument fails to establish its conclusion.

Keywords

Priority Fundamentality Metaphysical explanation Truthmaking 

Notes

Acknowledgments

Many thanks to Elizabeth Barnes, Ross Cameron, Dominic Gregory, Eric Olson, Jason Turner, Robbie Williams, Richard Woodward, and an anonymous referee for this journal. I’d also like to take this opportunity to thank the Royal Institute of Philosophy for a Jacobsen Fellowship which supported me financially during the writing of this paper.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of SheffieldSheffieldUK

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