Notes
The definition of a virtue as a will-engaging psychological property that can be an excellent way of being for the good should not be read as a claim about the possible history of any token of courage or moderation. It is not that we call Milton’s Satan courageous because his mastery of fears and willingness to undertake risky ventures could be (or could have been) recruited to serve the good. The (hard-to-assess) possibility of individual conversion is not what determines the status of a will-engaging feature as a virtue or not. Rather, the claim is that will-engaging features as types are to be considered virtues because some of their tokens are means to or parts of overall virtue. (I am unclear on why they should be called ‘virtues’ if they can also be means to or parts of vice, but perhaps this has to do with our interest in becoming virtuous: perhaps we have an interest in the parts of overall virtue, whether or not they can be parts of other things as well.).
What are we to say about would-be motivational virtues that are wrong about what the good is, or even about what is good? For example, what about the generous and highly materialistic relative who gives you high-tech gadgets for Christmas when you’d much prefer an afternoon of his time? Is he benevolent? Should we say of his generosity that such generosity can serve Virtue or that it already is part of his Virtue? Or does his lack of sensitivity to the priorities of others undermine his benevolence? Adams says that commonly being wrong about the reasons to limit or not limit the operation of one’s good motive is a failure of practical wisdom, not of benevolence, p. 190; he also says there are two virtues of conscientiousness—one of excellent responsiveness to one’s real obligations, and the other of a strong disposition to act as one believes one should, even if one’s beliefs are wrong p. 34. But why, on Adams’ view, is the former a distinct virtue rather than a condition combining the two virtues of (1) conscientiousness in the sense of the strong disposition to act as one believes, whether one’s beliefs are right are wrong, and (2) practical wisdom?
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Acknowledgement
I would like to thank Robert Adams, John Doris, Julia Annas (my co-panelists), and the audience at that session, for their discussion.
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These comments were originally prepared for an APA Author Meets Critics session on Robert Adams’ A Theory of Virtue.
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Kamtekar, R. Comments on Robert Adams, A theory of virtue: excellence in being for the good. Philos Stud 148, 147–158 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9504-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9504-5