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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 149, Issue 3, pp 297–304 | Cite as

Warrant is unique

  • Andrew M. Bailey
Article

Abstract

Warrant is what fills the gap between mere true belief and knowledge. But a problem arises. Is there just one condition that satisfies this description? Suppose there isn’t: can anything interesting be said about warrant after all? Call this the uniqueness problem. In this paper, I solve the problem. I examine one plausible argument that there is no one condition filling the gap between mere true belief and knowledge. I then motivate and formulate revisions of the standard analysis of warrant. Given these revisions, I argue that there is, after all, exactly one warrant condition.

Keywords

Warrant Huemer Merricks Plantinga Knowledge Epistemology 

Notes

Acknowledgements

Thanks to Bob Audi, EJ Coffman, Al Plantinga, Mike Rea, Brad Rettler, Chris Tucker, and audiences at Brown, Lewis & Clark, and Northern Illinois University. I dedicate this—my first paper to appear in my favorite journal—to Ciocchi, Crisp, and Ten Elshof: the best teachers an undergraduate could ask for.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of Notre DameSouth BendUSA

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