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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 147, Issue 3, pp 387–394 | Cite as

Eluding Wilson’s “Elusive Narrators”

  • David Davies
Article
  • 95 Downloads

Abstract

George Wilson has defended the thesis that even impersonal third-person fictional narratives should be taken to contain fictional narrations and have fictional narrators. This, he argues, is necessary if we are to explain how readers can take themselves, in their imaginative engagement with fictions, to have knowledge of the things they are imagining. I argue that there is at least one class of impersonal third-person fictional narratives—thought experiments—to which Wilson’s model fails to apply, and that this reveals more general problems with his argument. I further argue that there is no good reason to think that Wilson’s account applies more restrictedly to those impersonal third-person fictional narratives that feature in standard works of literary fiction.

Keywords

Fictional narratives Fictional narrators Thought experiments 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophy DepartmentMcGill UniversityMontrealCanada

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