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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 140, Issue 3, pp 335–358 | Cite as

Problems for a quantificational theory of complex demonstratives

  • David Braun
Article

Abstract

This paper presents a number of objections to Jeffrey King’s quantificational theory of complex demonstratives. Some of these objections have to do with modality, whereas others concern attitude ascriptions. Various possible replies are considered. The debate between quantificational theorists and direct reference theorists over complex demonstratives is compared with recent debates concerning definite descriptions.

Keywords

Complex demonstratives Quantification Direct reference Semantics Pragmatics Modality Attitude ascriptions Definite descriptions 

Notes

Acknowledgments

Thanks to Matti Eklund for inviting me to participate in a workshop on complex demonstratives at Cornell University on April 18, 2007. His invitation motivated my writing this paper. Zachary Abrahams was my commentator at the workshop; thanks to him for his insightful comments. Thanks to Jeffrey King and the audience at Cornell for helpful discussion. Thanks to Nathan Salmon for helpful correspondence. Thanks to Gail Mauner for many discussions and intuitions. Special thanks to Lynsey Wolter for her comments at Cornell and many subsequent discussions.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of RochesterRochesterUSA

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