Abstract
This paper discusses the prospects of a dispositional solution to the Kripke–Wittgenstein rule-following puzzle. Recent attempts to employ dispositional approaches to this puzzle have appealed to the ideas of finks and antidotes—interfering dispositions and conditions—to explain why the rule-following disposition is not always manifested. We argue that this approach fails: agents cannot be supposed to have straightforward dispositions to follow a rule which are in some fashion masked by other, contrary dispositions of the agent, because in all cases, at least some of the interfering dispositions are both relatively permanent and intrinsic to the agent. The presence of these intrinsic and relatively permanent states renders the ascription of a rule-following disposition to the agent false.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
The discussion of these issues is sometime framed in terms of following a rule and sometimes in terms of meaning. For current purposes we take the relationship to be as follows: if S means or understands plus by ‘plus’ then when S attempts to answer correctly a question expressed in the following terms ‘what is x plus y?’ S intends to follow the plus-rule.
It should be noted that for Kripke, the issues of justification are in fact a crucial aspect of the sceptical problem he is attempting to raise: “Ultimately, almost all objections to the dispositional accounts boil down to this one” (1982, 24). In this paper, however, we are only focusing on the problem of providing an account of what fact about an agent makes it the case that they are following one rule rather than another. We have nothing to say about what justifies the belief that an agent is following one rule rather than another.
As Kripke stresses: 1982: 26–27.
Some cases seem to blur the distinction between finks and antidotes. For instance, consider a building which is disposed to burn down if a fire is lit in the lobby. A fire is lit in the lobby, and some fire-fighters start to spray the building with water. The activity of the fire-fighters is arguably fink-like, because they make the building saturated with water, hence take away its disposition to burn down. Arguably, however, the spraying of the water is also an antidote, as it interferes with the process by which the building would normally burn down. We see no objection to concluding that, depending on the details, the activity of the fire-fighters could be both a fink and an antidote. A condition would be both a fink and an antidote to D if it both removes D before D can manifest and also interferes with those conditions that are required for the normal manifestation of D.
Strictly speaking the disposition normally remains in antidote cases—but need not in cases which are also fink cases—c.f. footnote 4. In what follows it is not necessary to consider cases of combined finks and antidotes.
It has recently been argued by Jennifer McKitrick that (1) dispositions need not have any causal basis (2003b) and that (2) dispositions can be extrinsic (in particular, they may have extrinsic causal bases) (2003a). Martin and Heil reject the idea of a dispositional property having a distinct causal basis, but also reject the idea that a disposition could be “bare”, lacking any causal basis. Thus it is easiest to treat their view as one whereby the dispositions they are interested in are intrinsic properties which are identical to their causal basis. While this view may encounter difficulties with respect to some dispositions, for current purposes Martin and Heil need only defend it with respect to the particular dispositions of human agents which are the basis of rule-possession.
This example is borrowed from Bird (1998).
See Choi (2005, 499–500), whose “nomic duplicate” heuristic for determining whether or not an object has a disposition coincides with this thought. Choi’s suggestion is that, if we are unclear whether an object has a disposition, perhaps due to strange, possibly finkish, circumstances, we ought to ask ourselves: is there a possible intrinsic duplicate of this object, subject to the same laws of nature (a “nomic duplicate”) which clearly does possess the disposition? Applying this test to an object like the enchanted glass will never yield a case where it is clear that the object has the disposition, because all possible intrinsic duplicates of the glass will also possess the enchantment. See also Handfield (2006) where Choi’s point is developed so as to apply to all dispositions, both intrinsic and extrinsic.
Masked abilities and compatibilism, unpublished ms. Draft version of 9 February, 2007.
To be fair to Martin and Heil, they do appear to prefer to talk of capacities rather than dispositions. And while clearly the concepts of disposition and of capacity are similar, there might be crucial differences, at least in ordinary parlance. In particular, it seems that ascribing a capacity to someone is to make a weaker claim than to ascribe a disposition to them. I am certainly capable of smoking. I have that capacity (that power, that ability). But I am not disposed to do so. Conversely, however, it is hard to imagine someone having a disposition to do something for which they lack the capacity. Even if capacities are weaker than dispositions, they nonetheless suffer also from finks and antidotes. If we were to rephrase the current discussion in terms of capacities, it could still proceed as currently. Let us consider the capacity to follow the plus-rule. The intrinsic and enduring features of humans, in virtue of which we die and decay (see Sect. 5), are surely incompatible with having the capacity to follow this rule for very large x and y. So even if Martin and Heil can point to intrinsic differences between Don and Van in virtue of which they have different capacities to add small numbers, it remains the case that the capacities of Don do not straightforwardly show that he is following plus, rather than some other rule, which will return deviant values for sums such as x plus y.
We will assume that the dispositions under consideration are deterministic. It is much less implausible that an object could have both of two probabilistic dispositions with incompatible manifestations. Thanks to Allen Hazen for this point.
References
Bird, A. (1998). Dispositions and antidotes. The Philosophical Quarterly, 48, 227–234.
Choi, S. (2005). Do categorical ascriptions entail counterfactual conditionals? The Philosophical Quarterly, 55(220), 495–503.
Handfield, T. (2006). Unfinkable dispositions. Synthese. doi:10.1007/s11229-006-9148-3.
Johnston, M. (1992). How to speak of the colours. Philosophical Studies, 68, 221–263.
Kripke, S. A. (1982). Wittgenstein on rules and private language. Oxford: Blackwell.
Lewis, D. (1997). Finkish dispositions. The Philosophical Quarterly, 47, 143–158.
Martin, C. B. (1994). Dispositions and conditionals. The Philosophical Quarterly, 44, 1–8.
Martin, C. B. (1996). Final replies to Place and Armstrong. In T. Crane (Ed.), Dispositions: A debate (pp. 163–192). London: Routledge.
Martin, C. B., & Heil, J. (1998). Rules and powers. Philosophical Perspectives, 12, 283–312.
McKitrick, J. (2003a). A case for extrinsic dispositions. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 81, 155–174.
McKitrick, J. (2003b). The bare metaphysical possibility of bare dispositions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 66, 349–369.
Acknowledgements
Both authors gratefully acknowledge the support for this research received from the British Academy and the Australian Academy of the Humanities, in the form of a joint projects grant. Handfield was also supported by a British Academy Visiting Fellowship and an Australian Research Council APD Fellowship while undertaking this research. Thanks to Allen Hazen, John Heil, Bruce Langtry, and audiences at University of Melbourne for helpful discussion. Thanks also to the Institute for Advanced Studies at the University of Bristol.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Handfield, T., Bird, A. Dispositions, rules, and finks. Philos Stud 140, 285–298 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9148-2
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9148-2