Philosophical Studies

, Volume 138, Issue 3, pp 429–434 | Cite as

Base property exemplification and mixed worlds: remarks on the Shafer-Landau/Mabrito exchange

Original Research


In this essay I distinguish between a synchronic view of base property exemplification and a diachronic one. I argue that only a diachronic view of base property exemplification can substantiate a ban on morally mixed worlds. I then argue that one of Robert Mabrito’s recent criticisms of Russ Shafer-Landau’s moral realism fails on either a synchronic or a diachronic view.


Moral realism Supervenience Shafer-Landau, Russ Mabrito, Robert Blackburn, Simon 



I would like to thank Paul Bloomfield and Michael Lynch for their insightful comments on an earlier draft of this essay.


  1. Mabrito, M. (2005). Does Shafer-Landau have a problem with supervenience? Philosophical Studies, 126, 297–311.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Shafer-Landau, R. (2003). Moral realism: A defence. New York: Oxford University Press, 88 pp.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy, U-2054University of ConnecticutStorrsUSA

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