Abstract
In this essay I distinguish between a synchronic view of base property exemplification and a diachronic one. I argue that only a diachronic view of base property exemplification can substantiate a ban on morally mixed worlds. I then argue that one of Robert Mabrito’s recent criticisms of Russ Shafer-Landau’s moral realism fails on either a synchronic or a diachronic view.
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Notes
This formulation of the supervenience argument comes from Mabrito (2005).
For the record, I do not think that Shafer-Landau’s ‘exhaustive constitution’ story about moral metaphysics is successful. However, since my criticisms are quite different from Mabrito’s they will have to wait for another time.
References
Mabrito, M. (2005). Does Shafer-Landau have a problem with supervenience? Philosophical Studies, 126, 297–311.
Shafer-Landau, R. (2003). Moral realism: A defence. New York: Oxford University Press, 88 pp.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Paul Bloomfield and Michael Lynch for their insightful comments on an earlier draft of this essay.
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Wisdom, J. Base property exemplification and mixed worlds: remarks on the Shafer-Landau/Mabrito exchange. Philos Stud 138, 429–434 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-9060-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-9060-1