Philosophical Studies

, Volume 132, Issue 1, pp 99–107 | Cite as

Experimental philosophy and philosophical intuition

  • Ernest Sosa
Original Paper


The topic is experimental philosophy as a naturalistic movement, and its bearing on the value of intuitions in philosophy. This paper explores first how the movement might bear on philosophy more generally, and how it might amount to something novel and promising. Then it turns to one accomplishment repeatedly claimed for it already: namely, the discrediting of armchair intuitions as used in philosophy.


Experimental philosophy Intuitions Casuistry Normativity Virtue Competence 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.PhilosophyBrown UniversityProvidenceUSA

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