Philosophical Studies

, Volume 138, Issue 2, pp 151–160 | Cite as

Modal fictionalism and possible-worlds discourse

  • David Liggins
Original Paper


The Brock-Rosen problem has been one of the most thoroughly discussed objections to the modal fictionalism bruited in Gideon Rosen’s ‘Modal Fictionalism’. But there is a more fundamental problem with modal fictionalism, at least as it is normally explained: the position does not resolve the tension that motivated it. I argue that if we pay attention to a neglected aspect of modal fictionalism, we will see how to resolve this tension—and we will also find a persuasive reply to the Brock-Rosen objection. Finally, I discuss an alternative reading of Rosen, and argue that this position is also able to fend off the Brock-Rosen objection.


Modality Fictionalism Brock-Rosen objection Possible world 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.PhilosophyUniversity of ManchesterManchesterUK

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