The main question of the paper is that ofwhat vagueness consists in. This question must be distinguished from other questions about vagueness discussed in the literature. It is argued that familiar accounts of vagueness for general reasons failto answer the question ofwhat vagueness consists in. A positive view is defended, according to which, roughly, the vagueness of an expression consists in it being part ofsemantic competence to accept a tolerance principle for the expression. Since tolerance principles are inconsistent, this is an inconsistency view on vagueness.
KeywordsMain Question Positive View General Reason Tolerance Principle Familiar Account
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- Eklund, M. 2002‘Inconsistent Languages’Philosophy and Phenomenological Research64251275Google Scholar
- Eklund, M. 2002a‘Personal Identity and Conceptual Incoherence’Noûs36465485Google Scholar
- Field, H. 1973‘Theory Change and the Indeterminacyof Reference’Journal of Philosophy70462481Google Scholar
- Graff, D. 2000‘Shifting Sands: An Interest-Relative Theory of Vagueness’Philosophical Topics284581Google Scholar
- Keefe, R. 2000Theories of VaguenessCambridge University PressCambridgeGoogle Scholar
- Lewis, D. 1970‘How to Define Theoretical Terms’Journal of Philosophy67427446Google Scholar
- Lewis, D. 1972‘Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications’Australasian Journal of Philosophy50249258Google Scholar
- Lewis, D. 1986On the Plurality of WorldsBasil BlackwellOxfordGoogle Scholar
- Lewis, D. 1997‘Naming the Colours’Australasian Journal of Philosophy75325342Google Scholar
- Rayo, A. (manuscript): ‘A Metasemantic Account of Vagueness’.Google Scholar
- Sainsbury, M. (1996): ‘Concepts Without Boundaries’, in R. Keefe and P. Smith (eds.), Vagueness: A Reader (pp. 251–264), Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. (Inaugural Lecture, King’s College London, 6 November 1990.)Google Scholar
- Williamson, T. 1994VaguenessRoutledgeLondonGoogle Scholar