Philosophical Studies

, Volume 125, Issue 1, pp 27–60 | Cite as

What Vagueness Consists In



The main question of the paper is that ofwhat vagueness consists in. This question must be distinguished from other questions about vagueness discussed in the literature. It is argued that familiar accounts of vagueness for general reasons failto answer the question ofwhat vagueness consists in. A positive view is defended, according to which, roughly, the vagueness of an expression consists in it being part ofsemantic competence to accept a tolerance principle for the expression. Since tolerance principles are inconsistent, this is an inconsistency view on vagueness.


Main Question Positive View General Reason Tolerance Principle Familiar Account 


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Copyright information

© Springer 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of ColoradoBoulderUSA

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