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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 137, Issue 2, pp 183–203 | Cite as

Stalnaker on sensuous knowledge

  • Scott Sturgeon
Article
  • 71 Downloads

Abstract

Robert Stalnaker has recently argued that a pair of natural thoughts are incompatible. One of them is the view that items of non-indexical factual knowledge rule out possibilities. The other is the view that knowing what sensuous experience is like involves non-indexical knowledge of its phenomenal character. I argue against Stalnaker’s take on things, elucidating along the way how our knowledge of what experience is like fits together with the natural idea that items of non-indexical factual knowledge rule out possibilities.

Keywords

Phenomenal Character Factual Knowledge Phenomenal Property Phenomenal Concept Phenomenal Experience 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyBirkbeck College LondonLondonUK

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