Philosophical Studies

, Volume 133, Issue 2, pp 233–255 | Cite as

Closure, Contrast, and Answer

  • Jonathan Schaffer
Open Access


How should the contrastivist formulate closure? That is, given that knowledge is a ternary contrastive state Kspq (s knows that p rather than q), how does this state extend under entailment? In what follows, I will identify adequacy conditions for closure, criticize the extant invariantist and contextualist closure schemas, and provide a contrastive schema based on the idea of extending answers. I will conclude that only the contrastivist can adequately formulate closure.


Philosophical Study Epistemic Logic Closure Schema Knowledge Ascription Relevant Alternative 
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Copyright information

© Springer 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Massachusetts-AmherstAmherstUSA

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