Philosophical Studies

, Volume 128, Issue 3, pp 515–538 | Cite as

Vagueness and the Metaphysics of Consciousness

  • Michael V. Antony


An argument is offered for this conditional: If our current concept conscious state is sharp rather than vague, and also correct (at least in respect of its sharpness), then common versions of familiar metaphysical theories of consciousness are false – namely versions of the identity theory, functionalism, and dualism that appeal to complex physical or functional properties in identification, realization, or correlation. Reasons are also given for taking seriously the claim that our current concept conscious state is sharp. The paper ends by surveying the theoretical options left open by the concept’s sharpness and the truth of the conditional argued for in the paper.


Functional Property Current Concept Identity Theory Conscious State Metaphysical Theory 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of HaifaHaifaIsrael

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