Philosophical Studies

, Volume 129, Issue 3, pp 575–603 | Cite as

What’s So Special about Self-Knowledge?



Intentional State Responsible Agent Discursive Practice Intentional Content Epistemic Authority 
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Copyright information

© Springer 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyVanderbilt UniversityNashvilleUSA

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