Philosophical Studies

, Volume 129, Issue 2, pp 317–333 | Cite as

The Frame Problem and Theories of Belief



The frame problem is the problem of how we selectively apply relevant knowledge to particular situations in order to generate practical solutions. Some philosophers have thought that the frame problem can be used to rule out, or argue in favor of, a particular theory of belief states. But this is a mistake. Sentential theories of belief are no better or worse off with respect to the frame problem than are alternative theories of belief, most notably, the “map” theory of belief.


Alternative Theory Practical Solution Belief State Relevant Knowledge Frame Problem 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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© Springer 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyClark UniversityWorcesterUSA

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