Advertisement

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

, Volume 12, Issue 3, pp 437–444 | Cite as

Phenomenal intentionality past and present: introductory

  • Uriah Kriegel
Article

A growing amount of research on intentionality within Anglo-American philosophy of mind has been focusing on the notion of phenomenal intentionality. How to characterize phenomenal intentionality is not a straightforward matter, but one relatively neutral option is in terms of counterfactual dependence: an intentional state has phenomenal intentionality just in case if it were not phenomenal it would not be intentional.1 Research focusing on phenomenal intentionality has tended to be guided by two insights. The first is that phenomenal intentionality is distinctive: it has certain special features lacking in other kinds of intentionality. The second is that phenomenal intentionality is basic: it enjoys some sort of priority, whether metaphysical or epistemological, over other kinds of intentionality. Commitment to these two claims has been the mark of an emerging research program for understanding intentionality.2Different treatments of intentionality within the research program...

Keywords

Phenomenal intentionality Intentional state Philosophy of mind 

References

  1. Block, N. J. (1995). ‘On a confusion about the function of consciousness.’ Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18: 227–247. Reprinted in N. J. Block, O. Flanagan, and G. Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  2. Block, N. J. (1996). Mental paint and mental latex. Philosophical Issues, 7, 19–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Bourget, D. (2010). Consciousness is underived intentionality. Noûs, 44, 32–58.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Brentano, F. (1874). Psychology from empirical standpoint. Edited by O. Kraus. English edition: McAlister, L.L. (1973). (Translated by A. C. Rancurello, D. B. Terrell, and L. L. McAlister.). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.Google Scholar
  5. Brentano, F. (1889). The origin of our knowledge of right and wrong. In R. Chisholm & E. H. Schneewind (Eds.), Trans. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1969.Google Scholar
  6. Chisholm, R. (1957). Perceiving: a philosophical study. Ithaca: Cornell UP.Google Scholar
  7. Desanti, J.-T. (1963). Phénoménologie et praxis. Paris: Editions sociales.Google Scholar
  8. Georgalis, N. (2006). The primacy of the subjective. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  9. Harman, G. (1990). The intrinsic quality of experience. Philosophical Perspectives, 4, 31–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Horgan, T., & Tienson, J. (2002). The intentionality of phenomenology and the phenomenology of intentionality. In D. J. Chalmers (Ed.), Philosophy of mind: classical and contemporary readings. Oxford UP: Oxford.Google Scholar
  11. Horst, S. (1996). Symbols, computation and intentionality. Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar
  12. Husserl, E. (1931). Cartesian meditations. Trans. D. Cairns. Dordrecht: Kluwer.Google Scholar
  13. Kriegel, U. (2003). Is intentionality dependent upon consciousness? Philosophical Studies, 116, 271–307.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Kriegel, U. (2009). Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  15. Kriegel, U. (2011). The sources of intentionality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Levinas, E. (1930). La théorie de l’intuition dans la phénoménologie de Husserl. Paris: Vrin.Google Scholar
  17. Loar, B. (1987). Subjective intentionality. Philosophical Topics, 15, 89–124.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Loar, B. (2003). Phenomenal intentionality as the basis for mental content. In M. Hahn & B. Ramberg (Eds.), Reflections and replies: essays on the philosophy of Tyler Burge. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  19. McGinn, C. (1988). ‘Consciousness and Content.’ Proceedings of the British Academy 76: 219–239. Reprinted in N. J. Block, O. Flanagan, and G. Güzeldere (eds.), The nature of consciousness: philosophical debates. Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1997.Google Scholar
  20. Meinong, A. (1904). On the theory of objects. In R. Chisholm (Ed.), Realism and the background of phenomenology. Glencoe: Free Press. 1960.Google Scholar
  21. Merlan, P. (1945). Brentano and Freud. Journal of the History of Ideas, 6, 375–377.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. Russell, B. (1905). Review of A. Meinong, Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie. Mind, 14, 530–538.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Sartre, J.-P. (1936). La Transcendance de l’ego. Paris: Vrin.Google Scholar
  24. Sartre, J.-P. (1943). L’Etre et le néant. Paris: Gallimard.Google Scholar
  25. Searle, J. R. (1990). Consciousness, explanatory inversion and cognitive science. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 13, 585–642.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  26. Searle, J. R. (1992). The rediscovery of mind. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  27. Siewert, C. P. (1998). The significance of consciousness. Princeton: Princeton UP.Google Scholar
  28. Strawson, G. (1994). Mental reality. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  29. Strawson, G. (2008). In his Real Materialism and Other Essays. Oxford: Oxford UP. Real Intentionality 3: Why Intentionality Entails Consciousness.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  30. Twardowski, K. (1894). On the content and object of presentations. Trans. R. Grossmann. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977.Google Scholar
  31. von Ehrenfels, C. (1890). ‘On Gestalt Qualities.’ Trans. B. Smith. In B. Smith (ed.), Foundation of Gestalt Theory. Munich and Vienna: Philosophia, 1988.Google Scholar
  32. von Ehrenfels, C. (1897/8). System der Verttheorie. Leipzig: Reisland.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Jean Nicod InstituteParisFrance

Personalised recommendations