Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

, Volume 7, Issue 2, pp 301–308 | Cite as

Collins’s incorrect depiction of Dreyfus’s critique of artificial intelligence

  • Evan Selinger


Harry Collins interprets Hubert Dreyfus’s philosophy of embodiment as a criticism of all possible forms of artificial intelligence. I argue that this characterization is inaccurate and predicated upon a misunderstanding of the relevance of phenomenology for empirical scientific research.

Key words

artificial intelligence Hubert Dreyfus Harry Collins embodiment phenomenology 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy, College of Liberal ArtsRochester Institute of TechnologyRochesterUSA

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