Heterophenomenology versus critical phenomenology

  • Max Velmans


Dennett’s heterophenomenology and the critical phenomenology that I outline may be thought of as competing accounts of a cautious approach to phenomenal description and method. One can be critical or cautious about how well or how reliably a subject can communicate his or her subjective experience in experimental settings, without for a moment doubting their existence or claiming them to be something completely different to how they seem. Given this, Dennett’s heterophenomenology with its accompanying “qualia denial” looks like nothing more than an attempt to shore up his counterintuitive, eliminativist philosophy of mind.

Key words

introspection heterophenomenology critical phenomenology qualia 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PsychologyGoldsmiths College, University of LondonLondonUK

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