Kuhn’s philosophical conception of science as evolutionary, social, and epistemological
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There has been a significant revival of interest in Thomas Kuhn’s work since his death in 1996, followed by the 50th anniversary of the publication of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions in Kuhn (1962, 1970). Now that the original controversies over Structure have largely passed into history, philosophers and (other) science studies experts are more inclined to accentuate the positive in Kuhn, acknowledging that his early work seriously altered the agenda of problems to be addressed, opened up new lines of investigation, and anticipated later developments. Few analysts consider Kuhn’s models of scientific development, early and late, to be correct, but many appreciate that having challenging and important problems to work on contributes more to the vitality of a field than a historically successful, entrenched orthodoxy that no longer produces new insights. Kuhn’s view of scientific development and decision making is similar.
Unfortunately, after Structure,Kuhn did not pay close...
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