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‘Estrangement’ in aesthetics and beyond: Russian formalism and phenomenological method

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Abstract

We investigate the parallelism between aesthetic experience and the practice of phenomenology using Viktor Shklovsky’s theory of “estrangement” (ostranenie). In his letter to Hugo von Hofmannsthal, Husserl claims that aesthetic and phenomenological experiences are similar; in the perception of a work of art we change our attitude in order to concentrate on how the things appear to us instead of what they are. A work of art “forces us into” the aesthetic attitude in the same way as the phenomenological epoché drives us into the phenomenological one. The change of attitudes is a condition of possibility of aesthetic and/or phenomenological experience. Estrangement is an artistic device that breaks the routinized forms of perception: one sees the thing as new and does not just “recognize” it automatically. Shklovsky insists that it is possible if one experiences or feels the form of the work of art—in an affective and even sensuous way. We claim that this is similar to the phenomenological seeing, or intuition, which, according to Husserl, should be devoid of all understanding. Phenomenological epoché can also be described as a philosophical technique that aims to arrest the “ready-made,” “taken for granted,” “pre-given” meanings in order to access a new meaning which is not yet stabilized, the “meaning-in-formation.” It is not enough to turn from what appears to how it appears; one has to oscillate between these conflicting attitudes, or rather to keep them both at the same time thus gaining a kind of a 3D-vision of meaning in its becoming. This double life in two different attitudes (or, following a Husserlian metaphor, “double bookkeeping”) can be clarified in terms of Roman Jakobson’s theory of antinomic coexistence between the poetic and communicative functions of language. The notion of “double life in two attitudes” uncovers the role that ostranenie can play in the philosophical transformation of the subject based on variety and essential mobility of the affective components involved. Proposing a phenomenological interpretation of a passage from Samuel Beckett we show how the radicalization of ostranenie can lead even to “meta-estrangement”: to estrangement of the everyday “lack of estrangement.” We conclude with a remark on the productivity of this form of estrangement in the phenomenological context.

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Notes

  1. Shklovsky (2011, pp. 283–284); Shklovsky (1970, p. 230).

  2. Husserl (1976, pp. 183–184), eng. tr. Husserl (1970, p. 180); Husserl (1992, p. 119), eng. tr. in Moran (2010, p. 181).

  3. For more details see Rubenstein 2009.

  4. Heidegger (1984, 166; eng. tr. 1994, p. 164).

  5. Within the phenomenological tradition one should mention numerous references to thaumazein in Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty; however both of them primarily treat thaumazein as a feature of philosophical, rather than aesthetic, experience. The task of philosophy is for Heidegger “to make the obvious incomprehensible and the unquestioned something questionable,… shocking common sense out of its presumptive self-glorification” Heidegger (1978, p. 6); eng. tr. (1984, pp. 5–6). The wonder has a function of “awakening:” to make the obvious incomprehensible…, so that we become awake.” (Ibid.) Merleau-Ponty understands phenomenological reduction as a key example of philosophical wonder, see Merleau-Ponty (1981, p. xiii, 1952, p. 247). See also Chernavin (2017).

  6. This brilliant research considers only Husserl’s life-time works, not the posthumously published Husserliana volumes; this particularly affects the claims regarding the role of eidetic variation in phenomenological reduction. See Hansen-Löve (1978, pp. 183–184).

  7. The Formalist theory does not only deal with literature. Young Jakobson was close to Malevich and was influenced by his ideas. See Jakobson and Pomorska (1983, pp. 8–9). There is a series of articles written by Jakobson and Shklovsky in 1919 while collaborating in the review Iskusstvo, in which they apply the key elements of their theory to painting. See Jakobson (1981, 2013) and Shklovsky (2005, pp. 54–57, 58–62). On Formalism and visual arts see also Hansen-Löve (1978, pp. 59–98).

  8. Cf.: “Music characterized by means of titles as music that presents something (als darstellende Musik). Symphonie Pastorale” Husserl (1980, p. 144), eng. tr. Husserl (2005, p. 167).

  9. In 1918 Husserl writes: “Earlier I believed that it belonged to the essence of fine art to present in an image, and I understood this presenting to be depicting. Looked at more closely, however, this is not correct… we <have> “images” within the cohesive unity of one image… Certainly depictiveness (Abbildlichkeit) is not the primary concern; rather, it is a matter of imaging (Bildlichkeit) in the sense of perceptual phantasy understood as immediate imagination” Husserl (1980, p. 514), eng. tr. Husserl (2005, p. 616). See also Dufourcq (2011, pp. 59–78).

  10. We could not find anything in Husserl’s legacy that indicates that he was aware of the existence of non-figurative painting. To the best of our knowledge, for Husserl, any work of art transports us to a certain world of phantasy, that is, a world in the mode of as if, while non-figurative painting or trans-rational poetry do not aim to create such a world. To the best of our knowledge, for Husserl, any work of art has an element of presentation (Darstellung), the model of Dartstellbarkeit can be traced even in Husserl’s theory of perception; according to A. Dufourcq, the objects of perception are “images of themselves” Dufourcq (2011, p. 306).

  11. On the reception of Potebnia’s legacy in Russian Formalism and Moscow linguistic circle see Pilshchikov (2014), eng. tr. Pilshchikov (2017); also Bakhtin (2003, p. 305). In 1935 Jacobson acknowledged the importance of Potebnia’s thought for Andrei Bely and Russian Formalism, see Jakobson (2011, p. 31).

  12. On the role of imagination in Husserlian phenomenology in general see Popa (2012); on the role of imagination in the phenomenological method see Dufourcq (2011, pp. 135–156).

  13. Frau Husserl was related to Frau von Hofmannsthal, see Hirsch (1968, p. 109).

  14. Hofmannsthal (1979, pp. 54–81).

  15. Husserl (1980, p. 370); eng. tr. Husserl (2005, p. 442).

  16. Holenstein (1976, p. 52), in Russian—ustanovka. See also Hansen-Löve (1978, pp. 213–214).

  17. Here, in order not to overload the reader with the jargon of Husserlian philosophy, we do not differentiate between 'acts' and 'quasi-acts' and also between “feelings” and “quasi-feelings,” when engaging with the problem of image and imagination.

  18. According to Husserl, this “double vision” or, to be more precise, “double perceptual apperception” is proper to the aesthetic experience in the case of theatre performance. See Husserl (1980, p. 517), eng. tr. Husserl (2005, p. 619).

  19. Fink (2006, p. 284).

  20. Bradford (2005, pp. 15–18).

  21. Shestova (2015, p. 302).

  22. Husserl (1980, p. 388), eng. tr. Husserl (2005, p. 496).

  23. Husserl (1994, p. 135), eng. tr. Husserl (2009, p. 2).

  24. Cf. Husserl (1980, p. 37), eng. tr. Husserl (2005, p. 40).

  25. Cf.: “For an aesthetic description, what counts is not what is depicted and what expresses the thing depicted, but how the thing is depicted and how the depicting is done. That ‘how’ is to be sought in the words and sounds of the poem.” Bely (1985, p. 235), italics added according to Russian original in Belyi (1910, p. 244).

  26. Jakobson (1979, p. 305, 330), Jakobson (1981, p. 718).

  27. Jakobson (1979, p. 336).

  28. Evolution of Jakobson’s views on the independence of the poetical function was beautifully summarized by Tsvetan Todorov (1982, p. 274); see also Winner (1987, p. 263).

  29. Jakobson (1987, p. 378).

  30. Shklovsky (1973, p. 42), eng. tr. cited by Eichenbaum (2012, p. 113).

  31. Eichenbaum (2012, p. 113).

  32. Husserl explains this in one of his later manuscripts: “The phantasies here are not freely produced by us (the creative artist alone has freedom here and exercises it only in union with aesthetic ideals). Rather, they have their objectivity; they are prescribed for us, forced upon us in a way analogous to that in which the things belonging to reality are forced upon us as things to which we must submit. In an analogous way—yet naturally not in quite the same way” Husserl (1980, p. 519), eng. tr. Husserl (2005, p. 620).

  33. Husserl (1973, p. 62), eng. tr. Husserl (1999, p. 46).

  34. Shklovsky (1973, p. 41).

  35. Shklovsky (1990, p. 10).

  36. There are two concurrent traditions of English translation of Husserl’s term Sinn: as ‘sense’ and as ‘meaning’. This is what L. Hardy says in his translator’s preface: “I have translated Sinn as ‘sense’ rather than ‘meaning’ (annexing the latter to Bedeutung). … As such, it far exceeds in scope the concerns of the philosophy of language; indeed, for Husserl, it also precedes those concerns insofar as all linguistic reference is ultimately founded on pre-predicative acts of consciousness” Husserl (1999, p. 12). Moran and Cohen claim that there are cases where translation of Sinn as ‘meaning’ would be suitable: “Husserl sometimes distinguishes ‘sense (Sinn)’ from ‘meaning (Bedeutung)’, although he regularly uses the terms interchangeably…. In his Logical Investigations, Husserl tends to use the terms Sinn, Bedeutung and also Meinung more or less as equivalent notions, although later, in Ideas I §124, he will restrict ‘Bedeutung’ to linguistic meaning only.” Moran and Cohen (2012, p. 296). Being aware of two concurrent translating traditions we use terms ‘sense’ and ‘meaning’ interchangeably.

  37. Shklovsky (1990, p. 6).

  38. Shklovsky (1990, p. 22).

  39. Jakobson (1987, p. 28).

  40. Shklovsky (1990, pp. 12–13).

  41. Cf.: “was mir bisher als Welt galt, als unmittelbar selbstverständlich… den Stempel der Unverständlichkeit hat und der Epoché unterworfen ist.Besinnung über die Unverständlichkeit der Welt aus Philosophie—führt zur Epoché.” Husserl (2002, p. 483). How does this problematicity of the obvious as a motivation of the phenomenological work match with the classical image of Husserlian rationalism? The Husserl with whom we are engaging in this paper deviates from the more traditional Husserl of Ideas I. Indeed, we examine Husserl's phenomenology not as a completed “doctrine,” not as a philosophical system, but rather as an Arbeitsphilosophie, as an open research project outlined in the manuscripts of 1920s and 1930s, see Chernavin (2014, pp. 185–239). In the supplements to Crisis (Husserliana XXIX) Husserl introduces the notion of “Sinnverwandlungund bewegliche Sinnbereicherung” (1992, p. 77), that is, an ongoing process of meaning-transformation and meaning-enrichment in which the phenomenologist participates. In these manuscripts, the accent shifts from “egology” or the analysis of noetico-noematic correlation to the elucidation of formation, enrichment and transformation of meaning. It is this aspect of the late Husserlian phenomenology that protects it from solidification into a philosophical doctrine.

  42. Husserl (1994, p. 134), eng. tr. Husserl (2009, p. 2).

  43. Husserl (2002, p. 482).

  44. Fink (1966, p. 192), eng. tr. Fink (1981, p. 31).

  45. Husserl (1973, pp. 76–77).

  46. J. Dodd remarks on the topic of pre-giveness in phenomenology: “This is what Husserl calls pre-given (vorgegeben): the pre-given is a given that never broaches on the questionable, thus which remains within the circle of what is familiar, as its center of gravity” Dodd (2004, p. 69). We can say that within the natural attitude the pre-given never becomes questionable, always stays familiar; but within the phenomenological attitude we start to question the ways of pre-giveness and in a certain sense we defamiliarize the familiar. Cf.: “die naive Vorgegebenheit der Welt wird problematisch” Husserl (1956, p. 59); “Nicht diese vorgegebene Welt, sondern das sie vorgebende transzendentale Sein und Leben… [ist] meine Sache” Husserl (2002, p. 319); cf. also “An inquiry into modes of pre-givenness distinguishes a transcendental investigation from an ontology insofar as it inquires into the ways in which the lifeworld is pregiven” Steinbock (1995, p. 103); cf. also Bégout (2005, p. 264).

  47. “Before the epoché the intentional object which belonged to the act of perception, was, as it were, ‘transparent’, one could look through it so that it was not itself visible… it comes into sight precisely because of the epoché” Ingarden (1972, p. 43).

  48. Shklovsky (1990, p. 6).

  49. Shklovsky (1990, p. 15, 22).

  50. Quoted in: Eichenbaum (2012, p. 114).

  51. Jakobson (1987, p. 87).

  52. Jakobson (2011, p. 36).

  53. “The Formalists [Jakubinsky, Brik, Shklovsky] began their work with the question of the sounds of verse [i.e. on the level of sensation]” Eichenbaum (2012, pp. 104–134).

  54. The notion of ‘horizon’ is indeed one of central notions of phenomenology; it is also one of the most complex notions of Husserl’s thought. S. Geniusas in his excellent overview of this subject qualifies it as an “operative notion” that was never properly clarified by Husserl himself, see Geniusas (2012, p. 17). We cannot analyse it here in much detail; for the purpose of the argument we only need to distinguish between the horizonality of consciousness of the existing object and the non-thematic world-horizon in general, as well as the idea of the genesis of sense (of the horizon of sense-formation).

  55. “In seeing I always ‘mean’ it with all the sides which are in no way given to me, not even in the form of intuitive, anticipatory presentifications. Thus every perception has, "for consciousness," a horizon belonging to its object…we are conscious of them as things or objects within the world-horizon” Husserl (1976, p. 161, 146), eng. tr. Husserl (1970, p. 158, 143, italics by Husserl); for more details regarding the intertwining of the horizon of the object and the world-horizon, see Geniusas (2012, pp. 179–182).

  56. Cf.: “It is the horizonality of experience that always remains the main focus whenever the question of the emergence of sense-formation is posed” (Geniusas 2012, p. 173).

  57. Husserl (1976, p. 161), eng. tr. Husserl (1970, p. 158, italics added).

  58. Henry (2008, p. 81).

  59. With regards to the problem of aísthēsis in phenomenology, see Brudzińska (2010).

  60. Cf. Henry (2008, pp. 12–21), Maldiney (1994, pp. 186–187), Richir (2000, p. 61).

  61. Husserl (1966, p. 211), eng. tr. Husserl (2001, p. 263).

  62. Husserl (1966, p. 212), eng. tr. Husserl (2001, p. 264).

  63. Shklovsky (2005, p. 61, translation modified).

  64. Shklovsky calls it raznopredmetnost’, multiplicity of objectness (2005, p. 61, translation changed); Hansen-Löve argues that a complete lack of object, objectlessness (bezpredmetnost’), is an extreme case of raznopredmetnost’, see Hansen-Löve (1978, p. 84).

  65. Shklovsky (2005, p. 54).

  66. Husserl (1980, p. 389), eng. tr. Husserl (2005, p. 462).

  67. Husserl (1980, p. 391), eng. tr. Husserl (2005, p. 464).

  68. Husserl (1980, p. 389), eng. tr. Husserl (2005, p. 462).

  69. Richir (1996, p. 8, 455).

  70. On the intertwining of the world-horizon and the horizon of existing objects, see Geniusas (2012, p. 182).

  71. Tolstoy (2010, p. 701).

  72. Shklovsky (1928, pp. 92–93).

  73. “Something vague and confused (chto-to nejasnoe, zaputannoe), which he could not at all account for, had come over him with the capture of that officer and the blow he had dealt him” Tolstoy (2010, p. 701).

  74. Tolstoy (2010, p. 702).

  75. Tolstoy (2010, p. 701).

  76. Jakobson (1987, p. 85).

  77. Jakobson (1987, p. 378).

  78. According to Husserl, every perception carries in itself the elements of anticipation. So, there is no mere perception, as there is no perception without apperception or ad-perception, without the surplus of meaning. In the same way, from the phenomenological standpoint, every giveness is pre-giveness: there is no giveness without pre-giveness. And finally, the apperceived content is never completely given or perceived, it is always outlined through the anticipation, see Husserl (2008, p. 438, 67). There is a kind of thought experiment: Husserl isolates the perception from apperception, the giveness from the pre-giveness, the present from the anticipated in order to see how the perceived or the given becomes incomprehensible, or “bizarre.”.

  79. Regarding the metaphor of oscillation in phenomenological context cf. Husserl’s use of Schwebe (1976, p. 159; 2002, p. 329, 420, 641; 2008, pp. 74–75, 784), Fink’s use of Schwingung as analysed in Finetti (2011), and Richir’s use of clignotement (1992, p. 110; 2000, p. 33).

  80. Richir (1992, p. 222); Richir (2001, p. 238).

  81. Richir (2015, pp. 160–161).

  82. Husserl (2002, p. 12, 16).

  83. Cf. also Arp (2004) and Staiti (2009). It is not the only strategy to explain the relation between attitudes that we find in later Husserl and young Fink (alongside with the “secondary mundanization” Fink (1988a, p. 138); eng. tr. Fink (1995, p. 126) and “unidirectional” conversion, cf. Husserl (2002, p. 10)), but we find it still very plausible because it helps to explain at the same time the regress in the natural attitude and the irreversible character of the phenomenological epoché.

  84. Richir (2000, p. 476).

  85. Cf. “Theoretical interest is related to aesthetic pleasure. The delight in knowledge—in mathematical knowledge, for example, because of the beauty of mathematical relationships, proofs, theories” Husserl (1980, p. 392), eng. tr. Husserl (2005, p. 464).

  86. Cf.: “Als Ich der Epoché habe ich mich aber wesentlich geändert. … Ich lebe ja weiter, ich blicke herum, ich will mir das Ding näher ansehen, ich übe positive Wissenschaft, theoretisiere mathematisch, etc.; … Aber ich bin doch nicht ‘mit dem Herzen’ dabei (‘mit dem Herzen’ mit Bleistift leicht gestrichen. - Anm. d. Hrsg.)” Husserl (2002, p. 10).

  87. Dufourcq (2014).

  88. Cf. Hansen-Löve points out that the formalistic description of the perception and recognition influences not only our world-perception but also the position of the subject, see Hansen-Löve (1978, p. 17).

  89. Cf. Sekatski, Ivanov, Orlova, Pogrebnyak, Razeyev, Savchenkova, Slinin (2002, pp. 83–126).

  90. Beckett (1965, p. 289, 182, 184).

  91. Keats (2009, p. 60).

  92. Fink (1988a, p. 9, 92); eng. tr. Fink (1995, p. 8, 83); Fink (1988b, p. 139).

  93. For an example of a similar technique in Andrei Platonov’s prose, see Olga Meerson (1997).

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Acknowledgements

Georgy Chernavin’s contribution was prepared within the framework of the Academic Fund Program at the National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE) in 2017–2018 (Grant No. 17-01-0082 “Phenomenological Investigation of the Obviousness”) and by the Russian Academic Excellence Project «5-100». He would like to thank Alexandr Sekatski for the inspiring idea of the phenomenological reading of Beckett’s “Trilogy.” Anna Yampolskaya was supported by the grant of the Russian Foundation for Humanities No. 15-03-00802 “Aesthetization and eventness in contemporary phenomenology.” She thanks Marci Shore, Andrew Haas and Mikhail Iampolski for fruitful discussions. The hospitality of the New York University is gratefully acknowledged.

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Chernavin, G., Yampolskaya, A. ‘Estrangement’ in aesthetics and beyond: Russian formalism and phenomenological method. Cont Philos Rev 52, 91–113 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-018-9454-8

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