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Platforms: a multiplicity of research opportunities

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Abstract

Platforms refer to intermediaries that facilitate economic interaction between two sets of agents wherein the decisions of one set of agents are likely to have an effect on the other via direct and/or indirect externalities. Given their nature, platforms need to find the appropriate balance between the competing objectives of agents and act as catalysts by facilitating the beneficial effects of externalities. In this paper, we discuss the current theoretical and empirical literature on two-sided platforms. We then identify three dimensions that offer opportunities to advance the empirical literature: (a) unanswered theoretical and conceptual questions, (b) data-related opportunities, and (c) methodological challenges.

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Notes

  1. If there is only one intermediary, then agents are “single-homing,” else they are “multi-homing.” Participation and profitability are different in these two settings (discussed later in detail).

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Correspondence to S. Sriram.

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This paper is based on the discussion among participants in a workshop (with the same title) at the 9th Invitational Choice Symposium at Erasmus University, the Netherlands, in June 2013. We are very grateful to the cochairs, Benedict Dellaert and Bas Donkers, for giving us the opportunity to hold this workshop at the symposium. Please direct all feedback to the cochairs at ssrira@umich.edu and pmanchan@umich.edu. The usual disclaimer applies.

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Sriram, S., Manchanda, P., Bravo, M.E. et al. Platforms: a multiplicity of research opportunities. Mark Lett 26, 141–152 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11002-014-9314-1

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