Journal of Management & Governance

, Volume 16, Issue 2, pp 235–268 | Cite as

Corporate governance convergence in Germany through shareholder activism: Impact of the Deutsche Boerse bid for London Stock Exchange

  • Sudi Sudarsanam
  • Tim Broadhurst


This case study examines the shareholder revolt initiated by a small activist shareholder, which eventually thwarted a takeover bid by Deutsche Boerse for the London Stock Exchange and forced the resignation of two of its highest profile board members. Primarily the case marks the emergence of the Anglo-American style shareholder rights movement in a country that offers only limited power to the shareholders of corporations. In the process it illustrates the mechanisms by which functional convergence of corporate governance regimes can occur long before the legal framework catches up. In Germany, the corporate governance regime requires stakeholder interests to be maximised rather than the sole interests of shareholders. This paper chronicles the shareholder actions that forced the takeover bid to be abandoned and seeks to provide an understanding of the motivations behind the activists’ campaign and the process by which they were able to overcome difficult odds and win their campaign. In this respect, it provides a useful insight into the processes used by relatively small investors to exercise their rights to thwart a takeover offer and topple some powerful corporate executives. Furthermore, the case illustrates how a single issue such as the strategic logic or the value creation potential of a takeover bid can rapidly spiral to become a wider campaign over deeply rooted governance concerns at targeted companies. Event study analysis reveals the stock market reaction to the activists’ intervention. Thirdly, the case sheds light on the importance of communication between management and shareholders especially when corporate decisions of great strategic import, such as a takeover, are being implemented. The globalisation of stock markets is empowering shareholders to assert their rights and their activism is driving corporate governance regimes towards greater convergence and recognition of the primacy of shareholder interests. Overall, the case raises a number of important issues regarding the corporate governance regime in Germany, the challenges posed by overseas investors, and the international convergence of corporate governance regimes. The case further suggests an additional mechanism by which international governance systems can converge functionally towards a common theme even if the form of national regimes remains largely unaltered. Our results are consistent with the institutional theory perspective of coercive isomorphism in adopting the shareholder value paradigm by Deutsche Boerse.


Corporate Governance Abnormal Return Hedge Fund International Financial Reporting Standard Supervisory Board 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of ManagementCranfield UniversityCranfieldUK
  2. 2.Capstone Mortgage ServicesLondonUK

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