Journal of Management & Governance

, Volume 14, Issue 2, pp 91–114 | Cite as

The impact of institutional changes on corporate governance mechanisms in transition economies

  • Son A. Le
  • Mark J. Kroll
  • Bruce A. Walters


We examine how institutional changes affect corporate governance in transition economies. We develop a transition model that specifies three stages of the transition process including the early, intermediate, and late. We develop a framework for assessing the effectiveness of widely recognized corporate governance mechanisms (CGMs) in and across these stages. Our general proposition is that as transition economies move from early, to intermediate, to late stages, effective CGMs tend to be those that are based on state administrative control power, social networks and private orders, and market forces and formal institutions, respectively. Our study has contributions and implications regarding the transition economies and the impacts of institutions on corporate governance.


Corporate governance  Transition economy Institution 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Management and Information Systems, College of BusinessLouisiana Tech University and National University of VietnamRustonUSA
  2. 2.Department of Management and Information Systems, College of BusinessLouisiana Tech UniversityRustonUSA
  3. 3.Department of Management and Information Systems, College of Administration and BusinessLouisiana Tech UniversityRustonUSA

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