Journal of Management & Governance

, Volume 12, Issue 4, pp 381–401 | Cite as

The antecedents of simultaneous appointments to CEO and Chair

  • Wallace N. DavidsonIII
  • Yixi Ning
  • David Rakowski
  • Eahab Elsaid


In relay succession, boards add the Chair title to successful CEOs, creating duality. Sometimes boards by-pass relay succession and appoint an individual directly into the dual position. We propose that this will occur when there is the need for an unambiguous leader and when the appointee has greater bargaining power. We show that following the firing of the predecessor, when the successor is an outsider, and when the successor is not the designated heir, the incidence of simultaneous dual appointments increases. We also find that executives appointed into the dual positions are older than those appointed only as a CEO.


Duality Succession Corporate governance 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Wallace N. DavidsonIII
    • 1
  • Yixi Ning
    • 2
  • David Rakowski
    • 1
  • Eahab Elsaid
    • 3
  1. 1.Finance Department – Mailcode 4626Southern Illinois UniversityCarbondaleUSA
  2. 2.School of Business AdministrationUniversity of Houston–VictoriaSugar LandUSA
  3. 3.Accounting & Finance DepartmentUniversity of WindsorWindsorCanada

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