Machine Learning

, Volume 67, Issue 1–2, pp 3–6 | Cite as

Introduction to the special issue on learning and computational game theory

  • Amy Greenwald
  • Michael L. Littman


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Copyright information

© Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceBrown UniversityProvidence
  2. 2.Department of Computer ScienceRutgers, The State University of NJPiscataway

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