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Angellic Content

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Abstract

I provide a truthmaker semantics for Angell’s system of analytic implication and establish completeness.

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Notes

  1. Since writing the paper, I came across the truth-tabular semantics of Ferguson [6]. Ferguson compares his semantics with Correia’s [5]; and it would also be of interest to compare it with my own truth-tabular semantics, given below.

  2. I should like to thank a number of people for helpful discussion of the topic of this paper. They include the participants at a seminar at NYU and the audiences at talks which I gave at the New York Philosophical Logic Group and at a workshop of the Mathematical Philosophical Group in Munich. I have also greatly benefitted from the writings of Fabrice Correia, Lloyd Humberstone, and Steve Yablo.

  3. Branden Fitelson has used a computer program to show that these axioms and rules are indeed independent of one another.

  4. Models with a component R for ‘reality’ are also considered in Fine [8].

References

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  8. Fine, K. (2014). Truthmaker Semantics for Intuitionistic Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 43.2, 549–77. reprinted in Philosophers’ Annual for 2014.

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  9. Fine, K. (2014). Constructing the Impossible’, to appear in a volume for Dorothy Eddgington.

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  12. Humberstone, L. (2003). False though Partly True - An Experiment in Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 32(6), 613–665.

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  15. Parry, W.T. (1933). Ein Axiomensystem fur eine neue Art von Implikation (Analytische Implikation), Ergebnisse eines Mathematischen Kolloquiums 4, pp. 5–6.

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  1. New York University, NY, USA

    Kit Fine

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  1. Kit Fine
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Fine, K. Angellic Content. J Philos Logic 45, 199–226 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-015-9371-9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-015-9371-9

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