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Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 42, Issue 2, pp 241–283 | Cite as

Tensed Mereology

  • Paul Hovda
Article

Abstract

Classical mereology (CM) is usually taken to be formulated in a tenseless language, and is therefore associated with a four-dimensionalist metaphysics. This paper presents three ways one might integrate the core idea of flat plenitude, i.e., that every suitable condition or property has exactly one mereological fusion, with a tensed logical setting. All require a revised notion of mereological fusion. The candidates differ over how they conceive parthood to interact with existence in time, which connects to the distinction between endurance and perdurance. Similar issues arise for the integration of mereology with modality, and much of our discussion applies to this project as well.

Keywords

Mereology Tense Modality Time Plenitude Endurance Perdurance Mereological sum Mereological fusion Four-dimensionalism Three-dimensionalism 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Reed CollegePortlandUSA

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