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Tensed Mereology

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Abstract

Classical mereology (CM) is usually taken to be formulated in a tenseless language, and is therefore associated with a four-dimensionalist metaphysics. This paper presents three ways one might integrate the core idea of flat plenitude, i.e., that every suitable condition or property has exactly one mereological fusion, with a tensed logical setting. All require a revised notion of mereological fusion. The candidates differ over how they conceive parthood to interact with existence in time, which connects to the distinction between endurance and perdurance. Similar issues arise for the integration of mereology with modality, and much of our discussion applies to this project as well.

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  1. Reed College, 3203 SE Woodstock Blvd., Portland, OR, 97202, USA

    Paul Hovda

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  1. Paul Hovda
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Hovda, P. Tensed Mereology. J Philos Logic 42, 241–283 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-011-9220-4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-011-9220-4

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