Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 41, Issue 1, pp 115–142 | Cite as

Three Approaches to Iterated Belief Contraction

  • Raghav Ramachandran
  • Abhaya C. Nayak
  • Mehmet A. Orgun


In this paper we investigate three approaches to iterated contraction, namely: the Moderate (or Priority) contraction, the Natural (or Conservative) contraction, and the Lexicographic contraction. We characterise these three contraction functions using certain, arguably plausible, properties of an iterated contraction function. While we provide the characterisation of the first two contraction operations using rationality postulates of the standard variety for iterated contraction, we found doing the same for the Lexicographic contraction more challenging. We provide its characterisation using a variation of Epistemic ranking function instead.


Belief contraction State contraction Iterated belief contraction Degrees of belief 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Raghav Ramachandran
    • 1
  • Abhaya C. Nayak
    • 1
  • Mehmet A. Orgun
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of ComputingMacquarie UniversitySydneyAustralia

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