Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 36, Issue 1, pp 97–121 | Cite as

Ceteris Paribus Conditionals and Comparative Normalcy

  • Martin Smith


Our understanding of subjunctive conditionals has been greatly enhanced through the use of possible world semantics and, more precisely, by the idea that they involve variably strict quantification over possible worlds. I propose to extend this treatment to ceteris paribus conditionals – that is, conditionals that incorporate a ceteris paribus or ‘other things being equal’ clause. Although such conditionals are commonly invoked in scientific theorising, they traditionally arouse suspicion and apprehensiveness amongst philosophers. By treating ceteris paribus conditionals as a species of variably strict conditional I hope to shed new light upon their content and their logic.

Key words

ceteris paribus conditional comparative normalcy possible world semantics subjunctive conditional 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of YorkHeslingtonUK

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