Abstract
Logical puzzles like the doctrinal paradox raise the problem of how to aggregate individual judgements into a collective judgement, or alternatively, how to merge collectively inconsistent knowledge bases. In this paper, we view judgement aggregation as a function on propositional logic valuations, and we investigate how logic constrains judgement aggregation. In particular, we show that there is no non-dictatorial decision method for aggregating sets of judgements in a logically consistent way if the decision method is local, i.e., only depends on the individual judgements on the proposition under consideration.
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Pauly, M., van Hees, M. Logical Constraints on Judgement Aggregation. J Philos Logic 35, 569–585 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-005-9011-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-005-9011-x