Logical Constraints on Judgement Aggregation
Logical puzzles like the doctrinal paradox raise the problem of how to aggregate individual judgements into a collective judgement, or alternatively, how to merge collectively inconsistent knowledge bases. In this paper, we view judgement aggregation as a function on propositional logic valuations, and we investigate how logic constrains judgement aggregation. In particular, we show that there is no non-dictatorial decision method for aggregating sets of judgements in a logically consistent way if the decision method is local, i.e., only depends on the individual judgements on the proposition under consideration.
KeywordsAggregation Function Decision Method Atomic Proposition Agenda Condition Social Choice Theory
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