Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 35, Issue 1, pp 41–63 | Cite as

The Logic of Dominance Reasoning

  • John Cantwell


The logic of dominance arguments is analyzed using two different kinds of conditionals: indicative (epistemic) and subjunctive (counter‐factual). It is shown that on the indicative interpretation an assumtion of independence is needed for a dominance argument to go through. It is also shown that on the subjunctive interpretation no assumption of independence is needed once the standard premises of the dominance argument are true, but that independence plays an important role in arguing for the truth of the premises of the dominance argument. A key feature of the analysis is the interpretation of the doubly conditional comparative "I will get a better outcome if A than if B" which is taken to have the structure "(the outcome if A) is better than (the outcome if B)".


Epistemic State Belief Revision Causal Decision Theory Additional Premise Basic Sentence 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Division of PhilosophyRoyal Institute of TechnologyStockholmSweden

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