On admissibility in game theoretic pragmatics
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In a recent contribution in this journal, Sascia Pavan proposed a new game theoretic approach to explain generalized conversational implicatures in terms of general principles of rational behavior. His approach is based on refining Nash equilibrium by a procedure called iterated admissibility. I would like to strengthen Pavan’s case by sketching an epistemic interpretation of iterated admissibility, so as to further our understanding of why iterated admissibility might be a good approximation of pragmatic reasoning. But the explicit epistemic view taken here also points to some shortcomings of his approach in comparison to rivaling accounts.
KeywordsNash Equilibrium Epistemic State Pragmatic Reasoning Signaling Game Scalar Implicature
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