Linguistics and Philosophy

, Volume 37, Issue 3, pp 249–256 | Cite as

On admissibility in game theoretic pragmatics

A Reply to Pavan (2013)


In a recent contribution in this journal, Sascia Pavan proposed a new game theoretic approach to explain generalized conversational implicatures in terms of general principles of rational behavior. His approach is based on refining Nash equilibrium by a procedure called iterated admissibility. I would like to strengthen Pavan’s case by sketching an epistemic interpretation of iterated admissibility, so as to further our understanding of why iterated admissibility might be a good approximation of pragmatic reasoning. But the explicit epistemic view taken here also points to some shortcomings of his approach in comparison to rivaling accounts.


Nash Equilibrium Epistemic State Pragmatic Reasoning Signaling Game Scalar Implicature 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute for Logic, Language and ComputationUniversity of AmsterdamAmsterdamThe Netherlands

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