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Say What? A Critique of Expressive Retributivism

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Acknowledgements

Many thanks to Kenneth Baynes, Ishani Maitra and three anonymous referees for Law and Philosophy for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. Thanks also to participants at the 15th annual Harvard-MIT Graduate Philosophy Conference, where I presented a shorter version of the paper, and to my commentator Japa Pallikkathayil for helpful comments and questions.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Syracuse University, 541 Hall of Languages, Syracuse, NY, 13244-1170, USA

    Nathan Hanna

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  1. Nathan Hanna
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Correspondence to Nathan Hanna.

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Hanna, N. Say What? A Critique of Expressive Retributivism. Law and Philos 27, 123–150 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-007-9014-6

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