Abstract
A widespread presumption in the law is that giving jurors nullification instructions would result in “chaos”—jurors guided not by law but by their emotions and personal biases. We propose a model of juror nullification that posits an interaction between the nature of the trial (viz. whether the fairness of the law is at issue), nullification instructions, and emotional biases on juror decision-making. Mock jurors considered a trial online which varied the presence a nullification instructions, whether the trial raised issues of the law's fairness (murder for profit vs. euthanasia), and emotionally biasing information (that affected jurors’ liking for the victim). Only when jurors were in receipt of nullification instructions in a nullification-relevant trial were they sensitive to emotionally biasing information. Emotional biases did not affect evidence processing but did affect emotional reactions and verdicts, providing the strongest support to date for the chaos theory.
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Notes
Our logic also has implications for nullification at the jury level, but this portion of the model is beyond the scope of the present paper.
The basic trial involved a charge of murder against Dr Daniel L. Wood. Dr Wood treated patient Henry Bates,76, who was ill with cancer and suffered from severe abdominal pain when he arrived at the hospital where Wood was a senior physician. Dr Wood had not previously provided medical care for Mr Bates, but was casually acquainted with Bates who was the grandfather of his surgical nurse, Ms Kepes. Mr Bates had been cared for by Nurse Kepes in her home since he had become ill. Wood performed surgery on Bates to repair a perforation in the proximal duodenum which had led to diffuse peritonitis, an inflammation of the stomach wall. Over the next 8 days, patient Bates remained under Dr. Wood's care in the surgical intensive care unit. On the ninth day, Bates took a turn for the worse. The evidence suggested that there were chemical imbalances in Bates’ blood work and Dr Wood treated that condition vigorously. Dr Wood administered a drug in dosages well above the hospital's guidelines and at a much faster rate than deemed safe. The testimony of the other doctors and some nurses suggested strongly that Dr Wood, who brusquely dismissed the concerns of other nurses and physicians, was in fact too aggressive and Wood's treatment very likely was the immediate and proximate cause of the patient's death. The county coroner agreed with this assessment. The hospital investigated and so did the local police. The hospital suspended Dr Wood pending the outcome of judicial proceedings. The investigation took a number of months, and subsequently Dr Wood was indicted for the murder of Henry Bates. In all trial versions Dr Wood was portrayed as a rather abrasive surgeon, aggressive, self-assured, dismissive of the opinions of others, but highly competent.
The penalty recommendation asked “If the defendant were to be found guilty, how severe a penalty would you favor?” Responses were made on a 9-point bipolar scale anchored by minimum under the law and maximum under the law. Hence, our mock jurors were asked to assume the same role as the trial judge, and determine an appropriate sentence regardless of their own personal verdict preferences. However, it is possible that those who had found the defendant guilty would find it difficult to recommend a sentence. To explore this possibility, two additional analyses were conducted. First, we added participant verdict as a factor in the ANOVA of the penalty data. Unsurprisingly, those who thought that the defendant was guilty recommended a harsher penalty (mean=6.12) than those who acquitted [mean=4.52, F(1, 501)=62.56, p < .001, η2=.111], but the verdict factor did not interact significantly with any of the remaining factors. The Case main effect remained significant, F(1, 501)=6.75, p < .015, η2=.013, but the Instruction main effect did not. Second, the penalty data were reanalyzed excluding all participants who had acquitted the defendant. Again, the model contrast was not significant, t(283)=1.26, ns; the only other significant effect was the Case main effect, F(1, 283)=5.61, p < .02, η2=.011.
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Acknowledgements
This study was supported by a Grant #SES-0214428 from the National Science Foundation to the first two authors. The authors thank James Warmels for his help in data collection and coding. In addition we thank Thomas E. Willging, Barbara O’Brien, and Kristin Sommer who offered cogent comments on earlier versions of this manuscript.
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A. Horowitz, I., L. Kerr, N., S. Park, E. et al. Chaos in The Courtroom Reconsidered: Emotional Bias and Juror Nullification. Law Hum Behav 30, 163–181 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979-006-9028-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979-006-9028-x