The Journal of Ethics

, Volume 22, Issue 2, pp 225–233 | Cite as

Keith Lehrer on Compatibilism

  • Joe Campbell
  • Keith Lehrer


Keith Lehrer has been publishing on free will and compatiblism since 1960. Our concern here is to present an account of the development on his work on the subject.


Keith Lehrer Free will Compatibilism Moral responsibility Harry Frankfurt John Martin Fischer 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Washington State UniversityPullmanUSA
  2. 2.University of ArizonaTucsonUSA

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