Advertisement

The Journal of Ethics

, Volume 12, Issue 3–4, pp 193–201 | Cite as

New Essays on the Metaphysics of Moral Responsibility

  • Joseph Keim Campbell
Article

Abstract

This is the introduction to a volume of new essays in the metaphysics of moral responsibility by John Martin Fischer, Carl Ginet, Ishtiyaque Haji, Alfred R. Mele, Derk Pereboom, Paul Russell, and Peter van Inwagen. I provide some background for the essays, cover the main debates in the metaphysics of moral responsibility, and emphasize some of the authors’ contributions to this area of philosophy.

Keywords

Compatibilism Determinism Free will Incompatibilism Moral responsibility The principle of alternative possibilities 

References

  1. Ainslie, D. (ed.). 2008. Hume’s Treatise. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  2. Beebee H., and A. Mele. 2002. Humean compatibilism. Mind 111: 201–223.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Campbell, J., M. O’Rourke, and D. Shein (eds.). 2004. Freedom and determinism. Cambridge: The MIT Press.Google Scholar
  4. Campbell, J., M. O’Rourke, and H. Silverstein (eds.). 2008. Action, ethics, and responsibility. Cambridge: The MIT Press.Google Scholar
  5. Clarke, R. 2003. Libertarian accounts of free will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  6. Davidson, D. 1963. Actions, reasons, and causes. The Journal of Philosophy 60: 685–700. Reprinted in A. Mele (ed.) (1997, 27–41).Google Scholar
  7. Frankfurt, H. 1969. Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility. The Journal of Philosophy 66: 828–839. Reprinted in Fischer (1986, 143–152).Google Scholar
  8. Fischer. J. 1982. Responsibility and control. The Journal of Philosophy 79: 24–40. Reprinted in Fischer (1986, 174–190).Google Scholar
  9. Fischer, J. (ed.). 1986. Moral responsibility. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
  10. Fischer, J. 1987. Responsiveness and moral responsibility. In F. Schoeman (1987, 81–106).Google Scholar
  11. Fischer, J. 1994. The metaphysics of free will: An essay on control. London: Blackwell Publishers.Google Scholar
  12. Fischer, J. 1999. Recent work on moral responsibility. Ethics 110: 49–66.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Fischer, J. 2008. Responsibility and the kinds of freedom. The Journal of Ethics 12. doi: 10.1007/s10892-008-9032-0.
  14. Fischer, J., and M. Ravizza (eds.). 1993. Perspectives on moral responsibility. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
  15. Fischer J., and M. Ravizza. 1998. Responsibility and control: A theory of moral responsibly. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  16. Ginet, C. 1966. Might we have no choice? In Lehrer (1966, 87–104).Google Scholar
  17. Ginet, C. 1980. On Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  18. Ginet, C. 1989. Reasons explanations of action: An Incompatibilist account. Philosophical Perspectives 3: 17–46.Google Scholar
  19. Ginet, C. 1996. In Defense of the principle of alternative possibilities: Why I don’t find Frankfurt’s argument convincing. Philosophical Perspectives 10: 403–417.Google Scholar
  20. Ginet, C. 1997. Freedom, responsibility, and agency. The Journal of Ethics 1: 85–98.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. Ginet, C. 2002. Reasons explanations of action: Causalist vs. noncausalist accounts. In Kane (2002, 386–405).Google Scholar
  22. Ginet, C. 2004. Trying to act. In J. Campbell, M. O’Rourke, and D. Shier (eds.) (2004, 89–102).Google Scholar
  23. Ginet, C. 2008. In defense of a non-causal account of reasons explanations. The Journal of Ethics 12. doi: 10.1007/s10892-008-9033-z.
  24. Haji, I. 1998. Moral appraisability: Puzzles, proposals, and perplexities. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  25. Haji, I. 1999. Moral anchors and control. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29: 175–203.Google Scholar
  26. Haji, I. 2002. Compatibilist views of freedom and responsibility. In Kane (2002, 202–228).Google Scholar
  27. Haji, I. 2005a. Libertarianism, luck, and action explanation. Journal of Philosophical Research 30: 321–340. Google Scholar
  28. Haji, I. 2005b. Freedom, obligation, and responsibility: Prospects for a unifying theory. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29: 106–125.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  29. Haji, I. 2006. The Principle of alternative possibilities and a defeated dilemma. Philosophical Explorations 9: 179–202.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  30. Haji, I. 2008. Authentic springs of action and obligation. The Journal of Ethics 12. doi: 10.1007/s10892-008-9034-y.
  31. Haji, I., and M. McKenna. 2004. Dialectical delicacies in the debate about freedom and alternative possibilities. The Journal of Philosophy 101: 299–314.Google Scholar
  32. Kane, R. 1996. The Significance of free will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  33. Kane, R. (ed.). 2002. The Oxford handbook of free will. Oxford: Oxford University press.Google Scholar
  34. Lehrer, K. (ed.). 1966. Freedom and determinism. New York: Random House.Google Scholar
  35. McKenna, M. 2001. Source incompatibilism, ultimacy, and the transfer of non-responsibility. American Philosophical Quarterly 38: 37–51.Google Scholar
  36. McKenna, M. 2008. A Hard-line rely to Pereboom’s four-case manipulation argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77. Google Scholar
  37. McKenna, M., and D. Widerker, (eds.). 2003. Moral responsibility and alternative possibilities. Burlington: Asgate.Google Scholar
  38. McMurrin, S. (ed.). 1988. The Tanner Lectures in Human Values, Volume 8. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press.Google Scholar
  39. Mele, A. 1992. Springs of action: Understanding intentional behavior. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  40. Mele, A. 1995. Autonomous agents: From self-control to autonomy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  41. Mele, A. (ed.). 1997. The philosophy of action. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  42. Mele, A. 2005a. Libertarianism, luck, and control. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86: 381–407.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  43. Mele, A. 2005b. A Critique of Pereboom’s ‘four-case argument’ for incompatibilism. Analysis 65: 75–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  44. Mele, A. 2006. Free will and luck. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  45. Mele, A. 2007. Free will and luck: reply to critics. Philosophical Explorations 10: 195–210.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  46. Mele, A. 2008. Manipulation, compatibilism, and moral responsibility. The Journal of Ethics 12. doi: 10.1007/s10892-008-9035-x.
  47. Mele, A., and D. Robb. 1998. Rescuing Frankfurt-style cases. The Philosophical Review 107: 97–112.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  48. Pereboom, D. 1995. Determinism al dente. Noûs 29: 21–45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  49. Pereboom, D. 2000. Alternative possibilities and causal histories. Philosophical Perspectives 14: 119–137.Google Scholar
  50. Pereboom, D. 2001. Living without free will. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  51. Pereboom, D. 2003. Source incompatibilism and alternative possibilities. In McKenna and Widerker (2003, 185–199).Google Scholar
  52. Pereboom, D. 2005. Defending hard incompatibilism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29: 228–247.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  53. Pereboom, D. 2006. Is our conception of agent-causation coherent? Philosophical Topics 32: 275–286.Google Scholar
  54. Pereboom, D. 2007. On Mele’s free will and luck. Philosophical Explorations 10: 163–172.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  55. Pereboom, D. 2008. A compatibilist account of the beliefs required for rational deliberation. The Journal of Ethics 12. doi: 10.1007/s10892-008-9036-9.
  56. Russell, P. 1983. The Naturalism of Hume’s ‘reconciling project’. Mind 92: 593–600.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  57. Russell, P. 1992. Strawson’s way of naturalizing responsibility. Ethics 101: 287–302.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  58. Russell, P. 1995. Freedom and moral sentiment: Hume’s way of naturalizing responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  59. Russell, P. 2002. Pessimists, pollyannas and the new compatibilism. In Kane (2002, 229–256).Google Scholar
  60. Russell, P. 2008a. The riddle of Hume’s Treatise: skepticism, naturalism, and irreligion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  61. Russell, P. 2008b. Hume on free will. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2008/entries/hume-freewill/.
  62. Russell, P. 2008c. Free will, art and morality. The Journal of Ethics 12. doi: 10.1007/s10892-008-9037-8.
  63. Russell, P. forthcoming a. Free will and irreligion in Hume’s treatise. In Ainslie (2008). Google Scholar
  64. Russell, P. forthcoming b. Selective hard compatibilism. In J. Campbell, M. O’Rourke, and H. Silverstein (eds.) (2008).Google Scholar
  65. Scanlon, T. 1988. The Significance of choice. In S. McMurrin (1988, 149–216).Google Scholar
  66. Scanlon, T. 1998. What we owe to each other. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  67. Schoeman, F. (ed.). 1987. Responsibility, character, and the emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  68. Strawson, P. 1962. Freedom and resentment. Proceedings of the British Academy 48:1–25.Google Scholar
  69. van Inwagen, P. 1975. The Incompatibility of free will and determinism. Philosophical Studies 27: 185–199.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  70. van Inwagen, P. 1978. Ability and responsibility. The Philosophical Review 87: 201–224.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  71. van Inwagen, P. 1983. An Essay on free will. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
  72. van Inwagen, P. 1989. When is the will free? Philosophical Perspectives 3: 399–422.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  73. van Inwagen, P. 1998. The Mystery of metaphysical freedom. In van Inwagen and Zimmerman (1998, 365–374).Google Scholar
  74. van Inwagen, P. 2000. Free will remains a mystery. Philosophical Perspectives 14: 1–19.Google Scholar
  75. van Inwagen, P. 2004. Van Inwagen on free will. In Campbell, O’Rourke and Shier (2004, 213–230).Google Scholar
  76. van Inwagen, P. 2008. How to think about the problem of free will. The Journal of Ethics 12. doi: 10.1007/s10892-008-9038-7.
  77. van Inwagen, P., and D. Zimmerman, (eds.). 1998. Metaphysics. London: Blackwell Publishers.Google Scholar
  78. Wallace, R. 1994. Responsibility and the moral sentiments. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  79. Widerker, D. 1995a. Libertarian freedom and the avoidability of decisions. Faith and Philosophy 12: 113–118.Google Scholar
  80. Widerker, D. 1995b. Libertarianism and Frankfurt’s attack on the principle of alternative possibilities. The Philosophical Review 104: 247–261.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  81. Zimmerman, M. 1988. An Essay on moral responsibility. Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyWashington State UniversityPullmanUSA

Personalised recommendations