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The Journal of Ethics

, Volume 10, Issue 3, pp 295–313 | Cite as

Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and the Problem of “OOMPH”

  • William L. Rowe
Article

Abstract

Thomas Reid developed an important theory of freedom and moral responsibility resting on the concept of agent-causation, by which he meant the power of a rational agent to cause or not cause a volition resulting in an action. He held that this power is limited in that occasions occur when one's emotions or other forces may preclude its exercise. John Martin Fischer has raised an objection – the not enough ‘Oomph’ objection – against any incompatibilist account of freedom and moral responsibility. In this essay I argue that Fischer's not enough ‘Oomph’ objection fails to provide any reasons for rejecting Reid's incompatibilist, agent-causation account of freedom and moral responsibility.

Keywords

compatibilism libertarianism agent-causation oomph 

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Copyright information

© Springer 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyPurdue UniversityWest Lafayette

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