Merger Review: How Much of Industry is Affected in an International Perspective?

  • Jan De Loecker
  • Jozef Konings
  • Patrick Van Cayseele


The paper develops a methodological framework for quantifying the impact of merger control regulations. While most countries have different criteria in terms of sales, market shares or combinations of the above, and while listing an inventory of these criteria is easy, such an exercise does not provide an answer regarding their impact on the market for corporate control. A methodology is developed to compare empirically the percentage of firms affected in an industry in a country by the “clearing in advance” regulation. By comparing industries and countries, we are able to provide an indication of the impact of merger regulations for a large number of industries in Europe. As such we provide a first indication of the tightness of ex ante merger review.


merger control firm size distribution 

JEL Classifications

K21 L40 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jan De Loecker
    • 1
  • Jozef Konings
    • 2
    • 3
  • Patrick Van Cayseele
    • 2
    • 3
    • 4
    • 5
  1. 1.Economics Department, Stern School of BusinessNew York UniversityNew YorkUSA
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsK.U. LeuvenLeuvenBelgium
  3. 3.LICOSLeuvenBelgium
  4. 4.Faculty of Economics and EconometricsUniversiteit van AmsterdamAmsterdamThe Netherlands
  5. 5.LeuvenBelgium

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