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Journal for General Philosophy of Science

, Volume 37, Issue 2, pp 393–403 | Cite as

Why Does Laudan’s Confutation of Convergent Realism Fail?

  • Antonio Diéguez-Lucena
Article
  • 389 Downloads

Summary

In his paper “A Confutation of Convergent Realism”, Larry Laudan offered one of the most powerful criticisms of scientific realism. I defend here that although Laudan’s criticism is right, this does not refute the realist position. The thesis that Laudan confutes is a much stronger thesis than realist needs to maintain. As I will exemplify with Salmon’s statistical-relevance model, a less strict notion of explanation would allow us to claim that (approximate) truth is the best explanation for such success, even if it is accepted that there can be cases of unsuccessful (approximately) true theories and cases of successful false theories.

Keywords

convergent realism Larry Laudan scientific success scientific realism pessimistic meta-induction 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Departamento de Filosofía Facultad de Filosofía y LetrasUniversidad de MálagaMálagaSpain

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