Journal of Bioeconomics

, Volume 6, Issue 3, pp 295–316 | Cite as

Cognition and Extended (NSNX) Rational Choice: Some Early Results

  • Howard Margolis


The paper sketches a neoDarwinian model of cooperation, which is then used to analyze archived data from two prominent series of public goods experiments. Each of three tests supports a conjecture drawn from the model, but also reveals a cognitive complication.

cooperation evolutionary models experiments public goods 


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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Howard Margolis
    • 1
  1. 1.Harris School of Public PolicyUniversity of ChicagoChicagoUSA

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