International Tax and Public Finance

, Volume 24, Issue 3, pp 397–415 | Cite as

Majority voting and endogenous timing in tax competition



We model a timing game in tax competition where the initial capital is unevenly endowed within the country and the tax policies are determined under a majority voting regime. The model is characterized by a novel feature: The decisive voter imports capital at the individual level, while the country exports it at the national level. The paper finds that governments endogenously choose to play a sequential-move game, which is unlikely to associate with full capital ownership in the tax competition literature.


Tax competition Endogenous timing Voting 

JEL Classification

H30 H87 



The authors would like to thank the anonymous referees for their valuable comments, which have helped to substantially improve this paper. The research has been supported by Grants from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (Nos. 25245042 and 15H03366).


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Graduate School of EconomicsThe University of TokyoTokyoJapan
  2. 2.Graduate School of Public PolicyThe University of TokyoTokyoJapan
  3. 3.College of Business Administration and Information ScienceChubu UniversityKasugai-shiJapan

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