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Fighting Pleasure: Plato and the Expansive View of Courage

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Notes

  1. Thucydides History 3.82.4.

  2. Joseph W. Bailey, Congressional Records. 32.3, March 8, 1898, 2616.

  3. See Laches 191d–e and Laws 1.633c–635d. Andreia is the Greek word for courage but it also expresses masculinity (the Greek word for man is anēr).

  4. See Nicomachean Ethics (NE) Book 3. Sōphrosunē, roughly, refers to moderation or temperance, but these words do not quite capture its meaning. This will become clearer in Section 3. For the sake of simplicity, I will translate this word as “temperance.”

  5. Most philosophical questions about courage center around either (1) the difference between strength of will (enkrateia) and courage or (2) whether courage necessarily involves goodness. Although these questions are interesting and worth exploring, I will not focus on them in this paper. My focus is to discuss a neglected issue with respect to courage; namely, the role that pleasure and desire play in being courageous.

  6. There are various versions of the unity of the virtues. Some scholars argue that the virtues are connected conditionally, see G. Vlastos, “The Unity of the Virtues in the Protagoras,” Review of Metaphysics, 25 (1972): 415–458. Other scholars argue that there is only Virtue and the context determines the descriptive name (e.g., courage, temperance, etc.), see T. Penner, “The Unity of the Virtue,” Philosophical Review 82 (1973): 35–68. Finally, some scholars adopt a middle position between these extremes, see T. Brickhouse and N. Smith, “Socrates and the Unity of the Virtues,” The Journal of Ethics 1 (1997): 311–324; S. Rickless, “Socrates’ Moral Intellectualism,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (1998): 355–367.

  7. For an argument against the unity of the virtues based on social-psychological evidence, see J. Doris, Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). For a response, see R. Adams, A Theory of Virtue: Excellence in Being for the Good (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), ch. 8–9.

  8. Laches 190e. Translations of Plato are my own, but are inspired by those found in J. Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson, eds., Plato’s Complete Works (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997). The Greek follows J. Burnet, ed., Platonis Opera (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1900–1907).

  9. Laches 191d–e.

  10. Ibid.

  11. Ibid., 192b.

  12. Ibid., 192c.

  13. Laws 1.625c–626c, 1.628e, 1.638a.

  14. Ibid., 1.626a.

  15. Ibid., 1.628c.

  16. Ibid., 1.630a–b.

  17. Ibid., 1.630c–631d.

  18. Ibid., 1.633c–d; see also 1.634a–635d.

  19. For the degree claim, see ibid., 1.626d–627a, 1.628a–b, 1.629e–630c; for the self-defeat claim, see 1.633e.

  20. This is similar (although different in important respects) to Aristotle’s point in NE, “One would think it strange to assert that things we should desire are counter-voluntary…The counter-voluntary also seems to be distressful, whereas what falls under appetite seems to be pleasant” (3.1.1111a29–33). Translations of NE are modified from C. Rowe in S. Broadie (Introduction and Commentary) and C. Rowe (Translation), Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). The Greek follows J. Bywater, ed., Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1894).

  21. NE 3.12.1119a21–26.

  22. 1.635c–d. The Athenian offers the provocative solution that drinking festivals and drunkenness are a way of training to build courage by exposing citizens to pleasure and desire so that they might learn to endure these feelings (1.649c–650b, 2.666b–c, and 2.671b–d; see N. Baima, “Playing with Intoxication: On the Cultivation of Shame and Virtue in Plato’s Laws,” Apeiron 51 (2018): 345–370; “On the Value of Drunkenness in the Laws,” Logical Analysis and the History of Philosophy 20 (2017): 65–81.

  23. This shouldn’t come as much of surprise, however, since Laches clearly admires the Spartan’s approach to courage (see 182e–183b).

  24. D. Frede, “Puppets on Strings: Moral Psychology in Laws Books 1 and 2,” in C. Bobonich, ed., Plato’s Laws: A Critical Guide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 108–126, pp. 114–115.

  25. S. S. Meyer, trans. and commentary, Plato: Laws 1 and 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 127.

  26. See T. Pangle, trans. and essay, The Laws of Plato (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), p. 389; S. Benardete, Plato’s Laws: The Discovery of Being (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2000), p. 28; E. Salem, “The Long and Winding Road: Impediments to Inquiry in Book 1 of the Laws,” in G. Recco and E. Sanday, eds., Plato’s Laws: Force and Truth in Politics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 48–59, p. 52.

  27. Republic 429c–d.

  28. Ibid., 429d–430b.

  29. Ibid., 442b–c; see also Gorgias 507b–c.

  30. G. Santas. “Socrates at Work on Virtue and Knowledge in Plato’s Laches,” Review of Metaphysics 22 (1969), 433–460, p. 442; see also, W. T. Schmid, On Manly Courage: A Study of Plato’s Laches (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1992), p. 107.

  31. See Laws 1.644c–d; Laches 198b–c; Timaeus 69d; Protagoras 351a.

  32. For a discussion of this in the Laws, see Baima 2018, op. cit., pp. 349–352. This principle follows Plato’s principle of non-opposition of the Republic (4.436b–c), which holds that the same thing cannot do or undergo the opposite thing, in the same respect, in relation to the same thing, at the same time. I’m leaving aside issues concerning parts of the soul for the sake of simplicity.

  33. Laws 1.647b–c.

  34. See Gorgias 480e–481b.

  35. See Apology 28b, 29a–30c, 34c, 40c–41c; Gorgias 469b, 522e; Crito 46c; Republic 3.386a–388e; 10.603e–604d; cf. Phaedo 63b. For a useful discussion, see E. Austin, “Prudence and the Fear of Death in Plato’s Apology,” Ancient Philosophy 30 (2010): 39–55; cf. N. Baima, “Death and the Limits of Truth in the Phaedo,” Apeiron 48 (2015): 263–284.

  36. Republic 6.505b. See also ibid., 9.588a; Gorgias 495d–e, 500d; Philebus 11b–c, 21a–d, 54a–d, 59e–67b; Laws 2.662a, 2.663a–b.

  37. I say “primarily” because Aristotle does include pain in his discussion of temperance, namely the pain of missing pleasure (3.10.1117b24–27; 3.11.1119a3–5). Additionally, pleasure is a part of courage in that courage involves the emotion “daring” (tharros) and pleasure accompanies daring (1381b13–16); see, C. Young, “Courage,” in G. Anagnostopoulos, ed., A Companion to Aristotle (Oxford: Blackwell, 2009), 442–456.

  38. 1.9.1366b.11–16. Translation is my own, the Greek follows W. D. Ross, ed., Aristotelis Ars Rhetorica (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959).

  39. I’m focusing on Aristotle’s account of courage in the Nicomachean Ethics. The account of courage presented in the Eudemian Ethics is different in important respects, see EE 3.1; J. Heil, “Why is Aristotle’s Brave Man So Frightened? The Paradox of Courage in Eudemian Ethics,” Apeiron 29 (1996): 47–74; Young, op. cit.

  40. NE 3.6.1115a24–1115a31. Most philosophers maintain that, for Aristotle, the courageous person experiences some fear of death; see S. Leighton, “Aristotle’s Courageous Passions,” Phronesis 33 (1988): 76–99, p. 85; Young, op. cit., pp. 446–447). For a more qualified view, see M. Brady, “The Fearlessness of Courage,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (2005): 198–201; for a counter, see H. Curzer, Aristotle and the Virtues (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 56–57. I think Brady, op. cit., p. 199, is correct when she writes, “While we may want to be neutral concerning the ends courage can serve, however, Aristotle is not. Part of the context of his discussion of courage is Socrates’ account of this virtue in Plato’s Laches. Since Socrates includes precisely the circumstances that Aristotle excludes, we are entitled to assume Aristotle is deliberately limiting the scope of this virtue…”; see also, A. G. Zavaliy, “How Homeric is the Aristotelian Conception of Courage?” Southern Journal of Philosophy 55 (2017): 350–377, pp. 350–351.

  41. See Brady, op. cit.; A. Duff, “Aristotelian Courage,” Ratio 29 (1987): 2–15; W. D. Ross, Aristotle (London: Methuen & Co., 1923), p. 207; S. Leighton, op cit., pp. 76–77; F. E. Sparshott, Taking Life Seriously: A Study of the Argument of the Nicomachean Ethics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), p. 150.

  42. See Curzer, op. cit., pp. 24–25.

  43. NE 3.10.1117b24–27, 3.11.1118b9–13.

  44. Ibid., 3.6.1115a6–7. See Broadie op. cit., p. 24; Young, op cit., p. 443; D. Pears, “Courage as a Mean,” in A. O. Rorty, ed., Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 189–199.

  45. NE 3.7.1115b25–29.

  46. Ibid., 3.7.1115b32.

  47. Ibid., 3.9.1117a29–31.

  48. This, of course, doesn’t explain why combating disease or naval warfare isn’t noble for Aristotle. Brady, op. cit., pp. 198–200, argues that the key difference between facing death at sea and during battle is that the latter involves the preservation of the polis (for a response and alternative answer, see Curzer, op. cit., pp. 24–29. I suspect that, more than anything, it is a result of Aristotle’s Homeric conception of nobility; see Zavaliy‚ op. cit.

  49. Schmid, op. cit., pp.107–109, denies that Plato is broadening the concept of courage. I’d like to touch on two points Schmid makes. First, he argues that in the Laches Plato only discusses the form of courage in the context of battle. This is a rather weak piece of evidence and it is rather inconclusive. Socrates might start with the model of courage as something that is easily identifiable, such as solider, but this doesn’t mean that this, for him, is the exemplar of courage—it is there for the interlocutors to recognize. Second, he says “from the conventional ancient Greek point of view, there is nothing unusual about Laches’ emphatic agreement that manliness does involve physical discipline in regards to desires. The man who is effeminate, or pleasure-or money-loving, or self-indulgent or lazy, or the like simply cannot be a citizen-warrior…,” p. 109. Although it certainly is true that some Greeks emphasized the importance of manly temperance (e.g., Aeschylus, see H. North, Sophrosyne: Self-Knowledge and Self-Restraint in Greek Literature (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966), ch. 2), Plato’s target is not these individuals; for my discussion on this, see the next subsection. Additionally, I don’t think too much weight can be put on interlocutors agreeing with Socrates since most don’t seem to fully understand what they are saying.

  50. G. Scarre, On Courage (New York: Routledge, 2010), pp. 1–2.

  51. W. I. Miller, The Mystery of Courage (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 8.

  52. Republic 8.560c–d.

  53. Statesman 306b.

  54. See ibid., 306e–307c; see also, Laws 3.696b.

  55. Gorgias 491b–e.

  56. Ibid., 491e; see also, 482e–484c.

  57. Ibid., 492a.

  58. Callicles uses the words malakia (softness) and anandria (literally, “without manliness”) to describe the person who follows the slave-morality of the masses. Despite not following the norms of the masses, philosophy is a feminine practice for adults (according to Callicles). This is because it lacks the action and assertion of politics (485b–e) and it leaves one defenseless like those who are dishonored (486a–c).

  59. It is important to remember that Callicles takes himself to be asserting what most people in the world think but are too afraid to express (492d).

  60. North, op. cit., p. 97. In Greek tragedy this conflict is, perhaps, most apparent in Sophocles’ Ajax. In this play, Ajax represents the traditional Homeric virtues of manliness and courage, while Odysseus represents the virtues needed for the flourishing of a polis, namely, temperance and wisdom. Thus, the tension between Ajax and Odysseus represents the tension between the heroic virtues and temperance; see ibid, p. 2.

  61. Ibid; see also, A. W. H. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility: A Study in Greek Values (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 61.

  62. North, op. cit., p. 21; see also Adkins op. cit., pp. 36–37; Odyssey 24.193, cf. 11.384.

  63. North, op. cit., p. 3n10.

  64. 3.8.16. Translation follows J. E. King, Cicero: Tusculan Disputations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1945); see North, op. cit., pp. 268–285.

  65. North explains that of the four cardinal virtues, the Romans had the most difficulty assimilating sōphrosunē; see ibid., p. 258.

  66. Ibid, p. 312.

  67. See Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 2.2.q. 161; North, op. cit., pp. 375–378; J. Newman, “Humility and Self-Realization,” Journal of Value Inquiry 16 (1982): 275–285.

  68. Both Aristotle and Christians used the term to emphasize the control of pleasure, but both did so for different reasons. Aristotle seems to have done it because he defines virtues in a much narrower way than Plato, so as to avoid any overlap; see Curzer op. cit., p. 23. The motivation for the Christian followers was to separate themselves from the pagans by emphasizing their purity and chastity, thereby highlighting how the pagans lacked these qualities.

  69. See Brickhouse and Smith, op. cit.; Rickless, op. cit.; Meno 87c–d, 88c–d; Laches 198c, 199b; Protagoras 350c.

  70. I would like to thank the following people for their help with this paper: Hannah Paperno, Clerk Shaw, Sarah Malanowski, Eric Brown, Jason Gardner, Charlie Kurth, Tyler Paytas, Emily Austin, Ashley Kennedy, and an anonymous referee. I would also like to thank my students at FAU and Mizzou for their helpful discussions.

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Baima, N.R. Fighting Pleasure: Plato and the Expansive View of Courage. J Value Inquiry 53, 255–273 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-018-9666-5

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