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The Journal of Value Inquiry

, Volume 50, Issue 1, pp 111–127 | Cite as

Enkratic Reasoning and Incommensurability of Reasons

  • Mathias Slåttholm Sagdahl
Article
  • 143 Downloads

There is fairly wide agreement that in order to provide an adequate theory of agency, we need to account for the central role of enkratic reasoning – the type of practical reasoning where an agent reasons to an intention to F from a belief that the agent ‘ought all things considered’ or has ‘most reason’ to F. Any view that admits of a widespread and systematic incommensurability of reasons, however, seems to have trouble with accounting for the centrality of this type of reasoning. If the reasons that apply to us tend to be incommensurable, then it seems that we cannot assess those reasons together, and so, it seems, neither can we arrive at any conclusion about what we ought all things considered, or have most reason, to do. This seems to leave little room for enkratic reasoning, and so views that admit of a widespread and systematic incommensurability of agency might be accused of not being able to account for our conception of agency.

Views that admit of a widespread...

Keywords

Practical Reasoning Human Agency Classical Conception Normative Belief Normative Reason 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Tromsø - The Arctic University of NorwayTromsøNorway
  2. 2.OsloNorway

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