The Journal of Value Inquiry

, Volume 48, Issue 2, pp 235–245 | Cite as

Gibbardian Humility: Moral Fallibility and Moral Smugness



Moral Belief Moral Community Moral Sensibility Moral Truth Fundamental Disagreement 


The Analects of Confucius

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of SheffieldSheffieldUK

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