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Pricing and Welfare Implications of Parallel Imports in the Pharmaceutical Industry

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Abstract

In this paper we investigate the implications of permitting parallel imports of pharmaceuticals produced by a monopoly, from one country to another. We use a model where countries differ in the patients’ level of co-payment for buying pharmaceuticals, and patients differ in the utility obtained from the consumption of pharmaceuticals. We show that the effects of parallel imports on total welfare are as follows: On the one hand, when countries differ in their health system only, parallel imports decrease total welfare; On the other hand, when countries differ in the health needs of their patients only, parallel imports enhance total welfare.

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Correspondence to Izabela Jelovac.

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Jelovac, I., Bordoy, C. Pricing and Welfare Implications of Parallel Imports in the Pharmaceutical Industry. Int J Health Care Finance Econ 5, 5–21 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10754-005-6599-x

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10754-005-6599-x

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