Human Studies

, Volume 33, Issue 4, pp 445–463 | Cite as

Teaching, Learning, Describing, and Judging via Wittgensteinian Rules: Connections to Community

Research Paper


This article examines the learning of a scientific procedure, and its connection to the greater scientific community through the notion of Wittgensteinian rules. The analysis reveals this connection by demonstrating that learning in interaction is largely grounded in rule-based community descriptions and judgments rather than any inner process. This same analysis also demonstrates that learning processes are particularly suited for such an analysis because rules and concomitant phenomena comprise a significant portion of any learning interaction. This analysis further reveals the elucidating merit of Wittgensteinian rules, their relation to community and the concept of practice, and promotes the efficacy of participant-generated rule-formulations as analytic descriptors.


Rules Wittgenstein Learning process Analytic description Community judgments Normativity 



I would like to thank Dr. Yasuhiro Igarashi of Toyama Prefectural University for allowing me to videotape his training. I would also like to extend thanks to the members of the Mind and Activity Discussion Group at Meiji Gakuin University in Tokyo, and especially to Dr. Aug Nishizaka for his extremely helpful comments. Data collection and analysis were funded by a grant from the Japanese Ministry of Education. Finally, any errors detected are my own.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Toyama Prefectural UniversityKosugi, ToyamaJapan

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